



ARTÍCULOS

MADRID, SOCIALIST CITY. THE KEYS TO PSOE'S SUCCESS IN THE 1923 GENERAL ELECTION

Madrid, ciudad socialista.

Las claves del triunfo del PSOE en las elecciones generales de 1923

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Resumen: Las elecciones generales de 1923 representaron el canto de cisne de la política representativa en Madrid durante la etapa de la Restauración. La expresión del voto de la capital española ha sido generalmente analizada en este contexto como un veredicto sobre la cuestión de Marruecos y el asunto de las responsabilidades exigidas tras el desastre de Annual. Sin obviar este detalle y otros relacionados con la presentación de un programa más moderado por parte del PSOE, este artículo indaga en la influencia que el marco urbano y la actuación socialista en el mismo jugaron en el resultado de los comicios. El análisis de la acción política municipal socialista previa a las votaciones permitirá ahondar en esta cuestión y entender el escrutinio final, observado desde una perspectiva socio-espacial micro analítica.

Palabras clave: Madrid, socialismo, política municipal, comportamientos electorales.

Abstract: The general elections of 1923 represented the swan song of socialism in Madrid during the Restoration period. The tendencies of voting behaviour of the city in this context has been generally analysed as a verdict on the question of Morocco and the issue of responsibilities required after the Annual Disaster. Having in mind this detail and others related to the presentation of a moderate program by the PSOE, this article explores the influence that the urban framework and the socialist performances in it played in the outcome of the elections. The analysis of the socialist municipal political action prior to voting will allow us to delve into this question and understand the results, observed from a micro analytical socio-spatial perspective.

Key words: Madrid, socialism, municipal policy, voting behavior.

INTRODUCTION*

The legislative election held in Madrid on the 29th of April 1923 went down in history for two main reasons: First, the election marked the end of the Restoration period and certified the death of the *Turno* in the Spanish capital, whose discredit had worsened since the 1917 crisis and inexorably so after the Disaster of Annual in 1921¹; secondly, and more important for this case, that election was the corollary of the unstoppable advance of Socialism in Madrid since the beginning of the 20th century.

During the Restoration, Madrid as a city did not favor the interests of the dynastic parties in the polls². The establishment of universal male suffrage in 1890 led to an era of sporadic, albeit emphatic, successes by Republicanism. When it focused on the unity of actions in legislative elections (1893 and 1903), it raised doubts about the robustness of the Canovist political model in the capital city³. The crisis of Maura's "long government" and the events of the Tragic Week fostered the coming together of Republicans and Socialists at the end of 1909⁴ for purely pragmatic reasons, as stated by Gillespie⁵. Both parties run together

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¹ Pablo LA PORTE: *El desastre de Annual. Frente al imperialismo europeo y los políticos españoles (1921-1923)*, Madrid, Biblioteca Nueva, 2007; Eduardo GONZÁLEZ CALLEJA, (coord.): *Anatomía de una crisis. 1917 y los españoles*, Madrid, Alianza, 2017; Salvador FONTENLA: *La guerra de Marruecos (1907-1927). Historia completa de una guerra olvidada*, Madrid, Esfera de los Libros, 2017.

² Javier TUSELL: *Sociología electoral de Madrid, 1903-1931*, Madrid, Cuadernos para el Diálogo, 1969; Rogelio LÓPEZ, "Madrid", José VARELA (dir.), *El poder de la influencia. Geografía del caciquismo en España (1875-1923)*, Madrid, CEPC, 2001, pags 383-420.

³ Amparo GARCÍA LÓPEZ: "Elecciones en Madrid en el cambio de siglo", *Arbor*, no. 666, 2001, pags. 383-410; Óscar ANCHORENA: "La sociedad civil democrática en acción: el republicanismo en el Madrid de la Restauración (1875-1923)", *Espacio, Tiempo y Forma. Serie V. Historia Contemporánea*, no.28, 2016, pags 73-94 and Santiago DE MIGUEL: "La Unión Republicana en el corazón de la monarquía. El triunfo electoral de 1903", *Historia Contemporánea*, no. 53 (II), 2016, pags 553-590.

⁴ Luis GÓMEZ LLORENTE: *Aproximación a la historia del socialismo español (hasta 1921)*, Madrid, Cuadernos para el Diálogo, 1976, pags 126-129 and Antonio ROBLES: "La Conjunción Republicano-Socialista: una síntesis de liberalismo y socialismo", Ayer, no. 54, 2004, pags 97-127.

⁵ Richard GILLESPIE: *Historia del Partido Socialista Obrero Español*, Madrid, Alianza, 1991, p. 35.

for the general elections held over the following decade and obtained important results in the ballot boxes such as in May 1910, March 1914 and June 1919. However, as time went by, the growing influence of the Socialists in the winning lists became more apparent. Although it is true that in 1910 Pablo Iglesias won the first seat for Madrid's socialist group, his name was the last on a list full of Republicans of all factions. Four years later he renewed his seat as the second name of the Republican-Socialist list, second to republican journalist Roberto Castrovido. However, in the general election of June 1919, those leading the joint list were Iglesias himself and Julián Besteiro⁶.

The above data reflects a conflicting evolution of Republicanism and Socialism in Madrid. The parties' weights were turned over, as one of them kept obsolete strategies to capture and mobilize social support whilst the other adapted to the new times, adopting increasingly more advanced mechanisms in order to organize and configure its internal structures, those of its core elements and the degree of participation of voters, supporters and activists. An example of this is the general election of 1923. This is clear if we look at the characteristics of the campaign deployed by the Socialist party and the constant references made during that time to the need for individual propaganda (as well as the official one), to the coordinated scrutiny of election proceedings and to the permanent collaboration with members of the UGT workers' communities. The republican parties, divided and with a weak proposal in 1923, fell behind.

Spanish historiography on the election processes of this historical context has clearly reflected the above-mentioned process and the growing existing competitiveness in the ballot boxes of the largest urban centers, such as Madrid⁷. However, there have been few

⁶ The break-up of the alliance in: Manuel SUÁREZ, "La división del republicanismo histórico y la quiebra de la Conjunción republicano-socialista", Santos JULIÁ (coord.), *El Socialismo en España. Desde la fundación del PSOE hasta 1975*, Madrid, Pablo Iglesias, 1986, pags 141-160. The socialist parliamentary rise in: Santos JULIÁ: *Los socialistas en la política española, 1879-1982*, Madrid, Taurus, 1996, pags 51ff.

⁷ José María MARÍN, "La ley electoral de 1907: ¿descuaje o consolidación del caciquismo? Las elecciones en España durante la crisis de la Restauración", Carlos MALAMUD (dir.), *Partidos políticos y elecciones en América Latina y la Península Ibérica*, Madrid, Instituto Universitario Ortega y Gasset, 1995; Salvador FORNER, Mariano GARCÍA, Rosa Ana GUTIÉRREZ y Rafael ZURITA, "Modernización social y comportamiento electoral urbano en España, 1910-1923", Salvador FORNER (coord.), *Democracia, elecciones y modernización en Europa. Siglos XIX y XX*, Madrid, Cátedra, 1997, pags 241-293; José VARELA: *El poder de la influencia. Geografía del caciquismo en España (1875-1923)*, Madrid, Marcial Pons, 2001; Carlos DARDÉ: *La aceptación del adversario. Política y políticos de la Restauración (1875-1902)*, Madrid, Biblioteca Nueva, 2003; Carlos DARDÉ, "Elecciones y reclutamiento parlamentario en España", Javier MORENO and Pedro TAVARES (eds.), *De las urnas al hemiciclo. Elecciones y parlamentarismo en la Península Ibérica (1875-1926)*, Madrid, Marcial Pons, 2015, pags 17-44.

who have focused on the influence played by the local context in the campaigns and the results of the general election. The Spanish capital did not live with its back to the unsustainable national political reality and the Socialists understood this perfectly, establishing a trend that was perfected with the Republicans from the beginning of the 20th century and that manifested itself intently in other European countries⁸. Public opinion contributed to their triumph, as it found in the party's minimal manifesto its means of expression. It is a commonly known fact that the political significance of the April 1923 election's result in Madrid had a close relationship with a public judgement on the issue of civil and military responsibilities after the Annual battle, focused on radical solutions of accountability put forward by the Socialists. However, we must not forget the influence of municipal actions carried out by the party in the city in the years prior to the election, responding to what they understood as social and economic needs of the population⁹.

For this reason, this paper looks into the fine-tuning of the socialist municipal politics in the years prior to the election, identifying motivations, incentives and spaces for local representation and management. Subsequently, we will look into the content of the election campaign related to the urban context. Finally, we will analyze the influence they possibly had in the final results, according to district, neighborhood and electoral section. Thus, the objective is to underline the importance of everything that happened in Madrid's urban context and that could affect the specific scenario of the election, especially at a time of social and economic conflict.

To fulfil that objective, we will carry out a deep analysis of the electoral records of 1923, focusing on any data that enables us to understand the degree of interaction of the Socialist party in terms of social bases. This analysis will be complemented with the documents coming from the Agrupación Socialista Madrileña (Socialist Group of Madrid) (ASM), stored by the Archive of the Pablo Iglesias Foundation, and with documents from the socialist press, key to understand the party's organization strategies during elections and to envisage the discourse characteristics of the national and local campaigns. Finally, the

⁸ Patrizia DOGLIANI : *Un laboratorio di socialismo municipale. La Francia (1870-1920)*, Milán, Franco Angeli, 1991; Uwe KÜHL : *Der Munizipalsozialismus in Europa*, München, R. Oldenburg Verlag, 2001 ; Aude CHAMOUARD : *Une autre histoire du socialisme: les politiques à l'épreuve du terrain, 1919-1920*, Paris, CNRS Éditions, 2013.

⁹ Santiago DE MIGUEL, "La Modernización de la acción política municipal en el marco de la transformación urbana de Madrid (1890-1923)", Luis Enrique OTERO and Rubén PALLOL (eds.), *La sociedad urbana en España, 1900-1936. Redes impulsoras de la modernidad*, Madrid, Catarata, 2017, pags 267-287.

minute books of the City Council of Madrid for the period 1920-1923 will allow us to know the content of the Socialists' proposals and actions in the senior municipal offices.

MADRID, A LABORATORY OF MUNICIPAL SOCIALISM. 1920-1923

The three years that elapsed between 1920 and 1923 were key for the evolution of Madrid's Socialism. At the onset, discussions on the adherence to the Third International were a hot topic, with an initial favorable opinion by the ASM. When the latter chose its ninth executive body in March 1921, that favorable opinion was turned upside down. The third Extraordinary Congress in April 1921 certified the division within PSOE and marked the birth of the PCE¹⁰. That division even reached the offices of the city council of Madrid, that at the time had the presence of councilors Antonio López Baeza and Mariano García Cortés, annexed to the Third International's manifesto. The split generated enormous tension in a council where the Socialists, despite the importance of the political event, showed never-ending activity that sometimes recalled that of Pablo Iglesias, Rafael García Ormaechea and Francisco Largo Caballero after their victory in the municipal election of November 1905¹¹. The Socialists had not had physical presence in the municipality between the elections of November 1917 and February 1920 due to sanctions on the members of the Strike Committee, chosen in the first of those elections. But when they were able to participate again, they carried out a municipal policy in line with the interests of a neighborhood involved in a process of great social and economic turmoil.¹².

Andrés Saborit and Julián Besteiro were the ones who better understood the appropriate meaning of municipality for Madrid's Socialism at the time. For the former, municipalities were, in essence, political schools and the engine for Socialists, and nothing

¹⁰ Please refer to the following on the split: Gerald H. MEAKER: *The Revolutionary Left in Spain, 1914-1923*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1974; Josep ALQUÉZAR and Ramón TERMES: *Historia del socialismo español*, vol. 2, 1909-1931, Barcelona, L'Avenç, 1989; Paul HEYWOOD: *El marxismo y el fracaso del socialismo organizado en España, 1879-1936*, Santander, Universidad de Cantabria, 1990, pags 105-143; Joan SERRALLONGA: *Pablo Iglesias. Socialista, obrero y español*, Barcelona, Edhsa, 2007, pags 727-741; Abdón MATEOS (ed.), Andrés Saborit. *Pablo Iglesias y su tiempo. Apuntes históricos*, Madrid, Pablo Iglesias, 2009, pags 866-894.

¹¹ Rubén PALLOL, "Socialistas en el Madrid jornalero. La conquista electoral socialista en el Chamberí de 1905", Antonio RIVERA, José María ORTIZ and Javier UGARTE, (eds.): *Movimientos sociales en la España Contemporánea*, UPV-Instituto Historia Social Valentín de Foronda, 2008; Santiago DE MIGUEL: *Republicanos y socialistas. El nacimiento de la acción política municipal en Madrid (1891-1909)*, Madrid, Catarata, 2017.

¹² Francisco SÁNCHEZ, *La protesta de un pueblo: acción colectiva y organización obrera, Madrid 1901-1923*, Madrid, Cinca, 2006.

related to them could be indifferent to a citizenship that required good infrastructures and services to defend their interests¹³. As it was mentioned later by Constantino Salinas when referring to some articles published by Saborit, denying the political nature of a council chosen by universal suffrage was a contradiction, as suffrage is the utmost expression of the will of the people¹⁴ Even if the city council was administrative and economic in its functions, it was political by essence and its representatives had to use their experience in the cities to adapt them to the needs of the new times. In turn, Besteiro believed that municipal Socialism had always been constructive and an engine of collective services that represented models of technical perfection and good administration. The city council that showed to be permeable to Socialist influence and was committed to the municipalisation of services was key to overcome the delay on social life evolution and the resistance found when transforming the institutional model of the *Turno* political organizations¹⁵.

The new city Council of Madrid, where the Socialists had an active participation, was formed at the beginning of April 1920, after obtaining seven seats in the previous municipal election held in February, that had drawn a new division of political forces in the city between the Socialists and Maurists. From then on, the Socialists set up a plan to activate municipal politics that affected several fronts. One of the most important ones had to do with food supplies, which increasingly affected the working classes and the low-middle class, which did not see their salaries increase as much as the prices of basic need items. The *Conquest of Bread* was one of the main goals during those three years, asking for the municipality to take the responsibility of baking the bread and selling it and demanding stricter inspections on the use of flours, in order to prevent the frequent abuses committed by the sellers¹⁶.

Manuel Cordero, deputy mayor for the district of Inclusa, was one of the most decisive figures in that front. He started as a baker in the bread bakery Viena when he arrived in Madrid in 1902 and became a member of the ASM in 1905. He became a counselor in the municipal election of 1920 aforementioned. Since he took position, he

¹³ Andrés SABORIT, "La intervención socialista en los Ayuntamientos", *El Socialista*, 25 January, 1945.

¹⁴ The text by Constantino Salinas, entitled "Consideraciones sobre el municipio español" and published in *Le Socialiste* in 1962, in: Enrique MORAL (ed.), *Andrés Saborit Colomer. Recuerdos de un concejal socialista*, Alcalá de Henares, Pablo Iglesias, 2017, pags 86-93.

¹⁵ Julián BESTEIRO, "Socialismo municipal", *Tiempos Nuevos*, no. 1, 20 April, 1934, p. 3.

¹⁶ Francisco SÁNCHEZ: *La protesta de un pueblo...*, op. cit., pags 94-96.

saved over 108,000 pesetas fighting fraud in bread sales by constant inspections of bread weight and by imposing monetary sanctions, leading at the same time a campaign against milk adulteration for which he filed 656 complaints. Food stores and groceries did not avoid constant monitoring tasks either. There were 253 complaints made for adulteration and lower weight in some food products. Bars, taverns, coffee shops and fishmongers with dubious hygiene conditions did not go unscathed either. In total, the money collected by Cordero from the fines since he took position amounted to 57,126.50 pesetas (financial years 1920/1921 and 1921/1922). That amount is very different to the mere 3,148.50 pesetas collected in the previous period¹⁷.

Madrid's Socialists also heavily criticized private companies that profited at the expense of the city council in terms of public transport. The trams' conflict was maybe the most important one in this field. Saborit censored the actions of Sociedad Madrileña de Tranvías which, with the invaluable support of capital coming from several private banking institutions (Banco de Bilbao, Banco Urquijo and Banco Español de Crédito), ended up dominating the city's whole tram network. The tensions in the municipality on the unification of tariffs and line reversion time frames with Sociedad Madrileña de Tranvías were constant. The Socialists always supported the municipalisation of the service to put an end to the financial excesses generated by the private operation and to support some working classes that could not afford the cost of a key urban transport mean to solve the problem of workers' housing¹⁸.

The issue of the underground was of similar importance. Since January 1922, the ASM criticized the discrepancy observed between the services of the recently created transport mean and its high prices¹⁹. On top of this, the company awarded the work, Compañía Metropolitano Alfonso XIII, rejected paying the taxes the Socialists wanted to impose from the city council. Led by Cordero and Saborit, the socialist councilors stressed the negative aspects of the project, such as the granting by the city council to the concessionaire of urban land for free for the creation of platforms and stations, and the abuses committed by the opening up of ditches, causing inconveniences for pedestrians

¹⁷ *El Socialista*, 19, 26 and 28 January, 1922.

¹⁸ Nuria RODRÍGUEZ, *La capital de un sueño. Madrid en el primer tercio del siglo XX*, Madrid, CEPC, 2015, pags 128-129.

¹⁹ "El Metropolitano o la tortuga subterránea", *El Socialista*, 21 January, 1922.

and for the peace of the neighborhood. The Socialists did not deny the favorable aspects of this new transport mean, but they wanted the works to be done under municipal inspection²⁰

In terms of urban planning, the Socialists were aware that Madrid needed new plans to adapt to a growing population, and this required a well thought of extension plan that relieved the pressure on certain urban areas and led to a comfortable and hygienic settlement of the most disadvantaged social sectors due to the global post-war economic situation²¹. The Socialists requested in the municipal sessions in which they participated the provision of solutions to the serious problem of lack of housing that was hurting Madrid since 1915²². In their opinion, what the city needed was not works for the purpose of increasing the decoration and urban beautification, that is why they opposed some of the projects planned at the time, such as the extension of Paseo de la Castellana or the creation of a newer and longer Gran Via that would connect the northern and southern areas of the old city and the Ensanche with the smart-looking avenue created by López Sallaberry and Andrés Octavio²³.

The Extra radio's urban development project depended to a large extent on the possibility to fix the problems that affected housing for those inhabitants since the beginning of the 1920s²⁴. It was a plan that would certainly bring with it the promotion of construction, housing price decreases and would alleviate the imposed unemployment in some sectors. Since 1911, there was an urban planning model approved by the city council for this space, designed by Pedro Núñez Granés. However, the municipality's technicians busied themselves in unproductive discussions on its feasibility. Meanwhile, the living conditions in Extra radio worsened considerably. The growing lack of land for construction in Ensanche

²⁰ Archive Villa de Madrid (AVM), Minute book of the City Council of Madrid (LAAM), municipal session held on the 10th of March, 1922.

²¹ Antonio GÓMEZ: "La industria de la construcción residencial. Madrid 1820/1935", *Moneda y Crédito*, no. 177, 1986, pags 53-81.

²² Mariano GARCÍA CORTÉS: *Diversas medidas para paliar los efectos de las crisis de la vivienda y de trabajo en Madrid*, Madrid, Imprenta Municipal, 1922; José BRAVO and Alberto LEÓN: *Escasez, carestía e higiene de la vivienda en Madrid. Medios al alcance de los Ayuntamientos*, Madrid, Imprenta Municipal, 1926.

²³ AVM, LAAM, municipal session held on the 27th January, 1922.

²⁴ Charlotte VÖRMS : *Bâtisseurs de banlieue à Madrid. Le quartier de la Prosperidad (1860-1936)*, Paris, Creaphis Éditions, 2012.

and the high prices led to overcrowded precarious constructions in an area that went from Paseo de Ronda to the borders of the municipality, complicating increasingly more the execution of a rational urban plan. As Besteiro said, in the sixty years before Madrid's expansion, the city had been witness to "the impulse of a painful need, unlike a natural and healthy phenomenon of growth, rather the sad overflowing of misery"²⁵. Madrid's Socialism was aware that the lack of housing in Interior and Ensanche was forcing the working classes and, later, the low-middle classes, to move to Extra radio²⁶.

However, there were many other important issues to address. It was essential to solve the maladministration observed in the organization of the staff of some services that depended on the municipality, to end the deficiencies of a Laboratorio Municipal de Higiene (Municipal Laboratory of Hygiene) whose tasks were crucial to guarantee decent food supplies to Madrid's citizens, to improve school facilities and those of the childcare institutes, basic to fight the high child mortality rates, and to grant housing to the poor and the homeless in new Disinfection Parks, adapted to the modern principles of social assistance of other large European cities.

Madrid's Socialists were gradually getting closer to the real living conditions of the population, namely in working districts. They carried out real direct civil participation in the political process, giving priority to health reforms in certain urban areas and the overcoming of differences identified versus other areas in terms of sewage, paving and real estate market. Nevertheless, it is also true that contrary to what happened a few years earlier, the ASM of 1923 did no longer represent exclusively the interests of the working class, it was also closer to the urban middle classes, economically more affected during the First World War. In the election processes, they had started capturing an important group of citizens with greater social heterogeneity, profiting from the identity crisis of the Republicans and the loss of contact of the latter with the public opinion during the previous years. The election of 1923 turned out to be a good example of this.

²⁵ Julián BESTEIRO, "Mientras discuten los técnicos. El proyecto de urbanización del Extrarradio", *El Imparcial*, 20 March, 1923.

²⁶ Julián BESTEIRO: *Conferencia sobre el problema de la vivienda y la acción municipal*, Madrid, Imprenta Municipal, 1920.

ALL MUST HAVE A VOTE. THE SOCIALIST ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN 1923

Tusell defined the election campaign in 1923 as not very enthusiastic in general in Madrid. Although that statement is true for most candidacies, the same cannot be said for the socialist candidacy, both in terms of strength and coherence. At the end of March, the party's leaders had already started calling on members of all districts to correct the electoral roll²⁷. It was a fundamental prior step to guarantee the truthfulness of the lists and to make sure the working classes had the highest possible representation in the figures of inhabitants with the right to vote in Madrid.

All must have a vote. To that end worked the local socialist groups, so that workers could visit, when checking their right to vote, a large network of centers belonging to the party and to the Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT). The central commission of Agrupación Socialista and the existing party circles in Extra radio (Cuatro Caminos and Bellas Vistas), in the south of the city center and in the north too, worked till midnight with the clear aim of facilitating the participation of the highest possible number of residents who were part of the working class²⁸.

During the weeks before the vote, the editions of *El Socialista* were full of warnings of this type and established direct communication with their supporters. They stressed the importance of individual propaganda besides the public/official one developed by the ASM in its candidacy. Although it was fundamental to mobilize the working masses in assemblies and halls, in rallies and conferences, and to shake up public opinion with posters, manifests, and press articles, it was also key to carry out propaganda at the bases, which could reach the deepest levels of the working layers. That was known as *the individual conquest of new consciences*²⁹.

²⁷ Archive of Agrupación Socialista Madrileña (AASM), call number 500-3, Minutes of the General Assembly of Agrupación Socialista Madrileña, 29 March, 1923.

²⁸ AASM, call number 501-4, Minutes of the meetings of the Committee of Agrupación Socialista Madrileña, 9 and 16 January, 1923.

²⁹ "La propaganda", *El Socialista*, 11 April, 1923; "Hombres de buena voluntad", *El Socialista*, 20 April, 1923.

Figure 1. Example of individual propaganda in the general election of 1923 in Madrid

Ciudadano elector:

Tú, seguramente, tienes amigos, compañeros, parientes, hermanos o hijos con derechos políticos y armados con la herramienta del voto. Tú tienes una conciencia política esclarecida y sabes dar un contenido real a tu voto. No dudamos que el 29 de abril votarás por el Partido Socialista. Pero tus amigos, compañeros, parientes, hermanos o hijos tal vez no tengan esa misma conciencia política esclarecida, y no sabrán dar una aplicación práctica a su voto. Y ya por desidia, o por pereza, o por olvido, no votarán en el día de la elección, o si votan votarán mal. Es indispensable que en el día mismo de la elección, tú, ciudadano elector, debes no solamente votar, sino hacer votar a tus amigos, compañeros y parientes. Para ello debes visitarlos en su propia casa anticipadamente, convencerlos de la necesidad de votar y darles la candidatura socialista, y ese día acompañarlos hasta el comicio, si ello fuera necesario. Así contribuirás, ciudadano elector, en forma eficacísima al triunfo de los ideales del Partido Socialista.

Source: *El Socialista*, 12 April, 1923.³⁰

In a context in which socialist supporters were no longer mere recipients of the party's general ideas, it was key to stimulate their activity to avoid an abstentions that grew unstoppably in Madrid. Throughout the campaign, the socialist community's efforts had to focus on overcoming political apathy. This was the most severe disease of the individual and collective spirit, alien to a socialism that was the militia of discipline, activity and vigor³¹. A moral problem was being defined in the heart of a society and its political behavior had to take a turn in this election to bring to light a participatory political culture and a mass of

³⁰ "Voting citizen:


Surely you have friends, colleagues, relatives, brothers or sons with political rights and with the possibility to vote. You have a clear political conscience and you must give real content to your vote. We do no doubt that on the 29th of April you will vote for the Socialist Party. But your friends, colleagues, relatives, brothers and sons may not have the same clear political conscience and may not know how to give a practical application to their vote. Perhaps, due to apathy, laziness or forgetfulness, they will not vote on Election Day, or if they do they will do so wrongly. It is necessary for you, on Election Day, you, the reader, not just to vote, but to make your friends, colleagues and relatives vote. Therefore, you must visit them in their homes previously, you must convince them about the necessity to vote and you must give them the Socialist candidacy, and on Election Day you must accompany them to the polling station if necessary. Thus, you will contribute very effectively, voting citizen, to the victory of the Socialist Party's ideals."

³¹ "La apatía", *El Socialista*, 13 April, 1923.

voters consciously committed. For similar reasons, it also highlighted the need to reduce political indecision felt by a significant group of voters, who could tilt the scales in an election of that nature. Therefore, it was necessary for the vote to be meditated and not the product of chance³².

Underneath all those considerations lay the aim to convert voting in an unavoidable duty for the working class, avoiding their tendency towards the Republicans and their omission or removal of names from the Socialist candidacy. Voting the latter fully was crucial to obtain the six seats, regardless of the fact that people from that social sector had little or no hope on the tasks that would be carried out by the future Parliament³³. Moreover, it was necessary to avoid the combination of names from different political candidacies in a same ballot paper, thus not falling into sympathies that could be felt for a person alien to the party's mandate. What should prevail in the citizens' political conscience was discipline, not the particular interests or the spontaneous manifestations of a feeling³⁴

Figure 2. Socialist propaganda against election abstentionism



Source: *El Socialista*, 26 April, 1923.³⁵

Inspectors played a key role in the previous tasks. The party organized a network of political figures of those characteristics to participate in all electoral sections of the districts and to guarantee honesty when exercising the right to vote. Several weeks before election day, the ASM started to call on supporters and activists who could participate in the polling stations, first choosing those who had already done so in previous occasions³⁶. As for those who wanted to participate and did not have enough knowledge on the procedures of the

³² "Los indecisos", *El Socialista*, 16 April, 1923.

³³ Luis GARCÍA PLAZA: "El votar es un deber", *El Socialista*, 21 April, 1923.


³⁴ *El Socialista*, 28 April, 1923.

³⁵ "No citizen should go without voting next Sunday. Abstaining is desertion, and voting wrongly is treason. All those who are exploited and all those who wish for a regime of greater freedom and justice must vote for the Socialist Party. CITIZENS, TO THE BALLOT BOXES!"

³⁶ AASM, call number 501-4, Minutes of the meeting of the Committee of the ASM, 3 April, 1923.

election day, conferences were normally organized to disseminate the most relevant aspects of the Electoral Law of 1907. Moreover, the party's press bodies were in charge of disseminating all kinds of instructions for the fulfilment of their tasks in the days prior to election day. They referred to the meetings organized by the party and UGT for the collection of documentation that accredited them and to specific behaviors to be followed during the voting. They urged to keep all documentation dealt with in the section, to then take it to the party's central election office and to write down in the electoral roll the people who voted and those who did not, as well as not to sign blank documents or reports that could be falsified later.

Figure 3. Warnings and instructions to socialist inspectors in the election of 1923



Source: *El Socialista*, 26-28 April, 1923.³⁷

For election day, the ASM presented 560 inspectors distributed in the sections of the ten municipal districts, either by the candidates themselves or by the proxies of the latter, although unequally. Based on those figures, we can imagine the size of the social bases that Socialism had in the city. Centro and Buenavista districts were the ones with fewer inspectors in the polling stations, followed by Congreso, Hospicio and Palacio, areas where

³⁷ "For your interest


We recommend our fellow proxies and inspectors to study the Electoral Act. It is essential to properly survey all operations and to REJECT SIGNING ANYTHING BLANK. The victory or defeat of the socialist candidacy can be decided BY ONE SINGLE VOTE! Attention to the election fight, comrades!

No socialist inspector must sign documents IN BLANK. Watch out for the thieves of blank or falsified reports! Remember the councilors' election in which they tried to falsify documents against comrade Gómez Latorre. The election DOES NOT END until the polling station seals and stamps the very last envelope. Proxies and inspectors must be the last to leave the polling station and the first to arrive in the morning. Comrades, let's not regret later what can be avoided in due time."

the party's candidacy obtained a lower number of votes, thus observing a correlation that is also true when analyzing the districts with the highest numbers of inspectors.

The social background of socialist inspectors followed the same pattern across the city. They came from sectors linked to qualified and non-qualified manual work. About 85% of them came from that category, with a great presence of typographers, printers and bookbinders from the industry of graphic arts, shoemakers from the shoe industry, builders, carpenters and cabinetmakers from the construction and wood industries and locksmiths from the metal industry. However, the most common professional status was day laborers

Figure 4. Distribution of socialist inspectors in the districts of Madrid in the election of the 29th of April of 1923



Source: Archive of Villa de Madrid, Secretariat (AVM-S), electoral reports of the 29th of April 1923, call numbers 22-251-1 to 22-254-2.

Table 1. Distribution of socialist inspectors in Madrid per professional categories

Social and professional category	No.	%
Liberal professionals and technicians	12	2.14%
Administrative and management workers	1	0.18%
Office workers and civil servants	25	4.46%
Sales people	18	3.21%
Service sector workers	14	2.50%
Farmers and forestry sector workers	2	0.36%
Production and transport workers	481	85.89%
No profession mentioned	7	1.25%
Total	560	100%
<i>Day labourers</i>	278	49.64%

Source: AVM-S, 22-251-1 to 22-254-2

There were other decisive elements of the social bases of the Socialist party in Madrid that contributed to the task of disseminating information on the minimum Socialist manifesto regarding the election and the supervision of the election. Its leaders and the electoral commission informed of the rules to supporters and members: to double up the propaganda efforts by handing out candidacies and manifestos all over the city³⁸. These processes had the participation of the Agrupación Socialista Femenina (Feminine Socialist Group) and the Juventudes Socialistas Madrileñas (Young Socialists of Madrid), which called on their members to participate in the party's common task and to attend the polling stations on election day³⁹. Both bodies carried out tasks that supported the proxies and inspectors, although they also participated with innovative propaganda strategies, such as driving cars around the streets of Madrid lit up with slogans such as: "Leave Morocco", "Remember Annual" and "Vote for the Socialists"⁴⁰.

After looking into the election campaign carried out by the lower and intermediate levels of the party, let us focus now on its leaders. First of all, we must highlight the collaboration of the working societies of Casa del Pueblo (House of the People), part of UGT, which was more intense than in previous occasions. One of the main objectives of Madrid's Socialism was to mobilize workers to vote and to vote favorably for candidates that represented their interests. In this sense, the letter written by Iglesias two weeks before the

³⁸ AASM, call number 501-4, Minutes of the meeting of the Committee of the ASM, 3 April, 1923.

³⁹ "Ante la lucha electoral. El Comité Nacional de Juventudes a sus secciones", *El Socialista*, 14 April, 1923. References on Madrid in: *El Socialista*, 24-28 April, 1923.

⁴⁰ "Los automóviles luminosos. Un éxito de la campaña socialista", *El Socialista*, 28 April, 1923.

election was significant. In it, he talked about the "damaging obstinacy" for the party generated by a large amount of city workers who were still in favor of abstentions⁴¹. However, the truth is that at the beginning there was a great interest amongst the working class for voting, organized through different strategies of moral and material support to the party and the candidacy. One of the most significant actions was their participation in the collective subscription organized by the ASM to raise funds to pay for election propaganda, key to overcome the party's lack of financial resources⁴².

The memos sent by UGT to all its sections in general, and by Casa del Pueblo to the workers in Madrid particularly, set the beginning of several days in which the working societies organized rallies and election conferences, published manifests and programs addressed at their members. Some of the most important events were those called by Grupo Socialista de Obreros de las Artes Blancas (Socialist Group of bakery and patisserie workers) (20th of April), by the members of Ramo de la Construcción (Construction sector) (21st of April), by the workers of Grupo Socialista de las Artes Gráficas (Socialist Group of Graphic Arts) (24th of April) and by the Grupos Socialistas de la Edificación (Socialist Group of Construction) (26th of April). Those events, as well as having the participation of the candidates present in the lists for Madrid, aimed to prevent abstentions and the potential Republican votes that could persist amongst the members of the working class⁴³.

The integration process of the protagonists of Madrid's labor market to the Socialist campaign also affected some liberal profession representatives and white-collar employees who were members. Amongst the former, the most important group was that of teachers, which highlighted the general guarantees that Socialism and its candidacy in particular represented for their social, cultural and economic interests⁴⁴. They stressed what some of

⁴¹ Pablo IGLESIAS, "Obstinación dañosa", *El Socialista*, 14 April. 1923.

⁴² "Las próximas elecciones. Suscripción individual y colectiva para la propaganda", *El Socialista*, 13 April, 1923.

⁴³ This was decided in: ASSM, call number 501-4, Minutes of the meeting of the Committee of the ASM, 10 April, 1923. In terms of press references on this issue, please refer to: "Circular de la Unión General. La clase obrera organizada debe votar los candidatos socialistas", *El Socialista*, 19 April, 1923; "Ante las elecciones. La Casa del Pueblo a las sociedades obreras", *El Socialista*, 21 April, 1923; "Ante las elecciones. El Grupo Socialista de Artes Gráficas, a sus compañeros de organización", *El Socialista*, 24 April, 1923; "Ante las elecciones. La Sociedad "El Trabajo" de Obreros Albañiles, a todos sus asociados", *El Socialista*, 24 April, 1923; "A los ferroviarios", *El Socialista*, 27 April, 1923.

⁴⁴ Basis of the socialist education programme: Alejandro TIANA: *Maestros, misioneros y militantes. La educación de la clase obrera madrileña, 1898-1917*, Madrid, C.I.D.E., 1992, pags 361-422 and Francisco DE LUIS: *La cultura socialista en España, 1923-1930*, Salamanca, Universidad de Salamanca, 1993.

the people included in the Socialist candidacy for Madrid meant for the evolution of state education locally. As a professor, Besteiro had presented in Parliament his position at the service of teachers and national schools. Fernando de los Ríos appeared as the great promoter in Spain of a unified school. In turn, Saborit was the councilor who had worked the most for the education of Madrilenians, promoting the construction of six school groups and embedding ethics in the operation of urban school colonies, entrusting the teachers of the National Schools with selecting their own candidates⁴⁵.

Regarding Madrid's shopkeepers and industrialists, their class representatives tried to disseminate the beneficial aspects of the socialist minority political actions developed in the city council, such as their request to avoid growing electricity prices, which went against the decision adopted by the Ministry of Labour. They looked for similar approaches with the city council's employees. Saborit and Cordero, in collaboration with Grupo Socialista de Obreros y Empleados Municipales (Socialist Group of Municipal Workers and Employees), mentioned promises in terms of salary improvements and of devoting broader budget items for the development of their work⁴⁶.

The favorable aspects of socialist municipal politics played a crucial role in this campaign. The group's position was clear with the note sent to Madrilenians on the 20th of March. It listed the problems pending solution that existed in the city⁴⁷. That note was the source of a rally held in Casa del Pueblo on the 27th of March, with the participation of Rafael Henche de la Plata - on the hygiene deficiencies in the baking industry and the frauds and adulterations committed -, Besteiro, who focused on the housing crisis, and Saborit and Cordero, who spoke about the negative consequences of including Antonio Sacristán, chairman of Círculo de la Unión Mercantil e Industrial (Circle of the Commercial and Industrial Union) to the monarchist candidacy for the interests of the inhabitants⁴⁸.

The hand played by the monarchists with Sacristan in this election was not innocent. In fact, he was the main opponent to the loan project designed during the mandate of the Count of Limpias in 1920 for urban improvements in Madrid, later fully defended by the

⁴⁵ "Asociación General de Maestros. Por la victoria de la candidatura socialista", *El Socialista*, 25 April, 1923.

⁴⁶ "Conferencia de Saborit. Presupuestos municipales", *El Socialista*, 14 April, 1923 and "A los trabajadores municipales", *El Socialista*, 28 April, 1923.

⁴⁷ "La Agrupación Socialista al pueblo madrileño", *El Socialista*, 26 March, 1923.

⁴⁸ "Los socialistas madrileños ante los problemas actuales", *El Socialista*, 28 March, 1923.

Socialists. When the first rumors on the application of a 10% surcharge on the industrial and commercial fees in order to obtain funds first appeared, Círculo de la Unión Mercantil started a strong opposition campaign led by Sacristán. From mid-March 1923, meetings had been held at that organization to decide on the convenience of commercial classes having their own political force for the election.⁴⁹ During the assembly held on the 16th of March, it was decided to present Sacristán as the candidate, and days later it was agreed to close all shops coinciding with the municipal session that would decide on the issue of the tax increase⁵⁰.

Madrid's shopkeepers went to Plaza de la Villa, home of the council, in a procession led by Sacristán himself. When the plenary session started, the demonstrators entered the building and caused a huge stir⁵¹. The Socialists announced that they would vote in favour of the tax, as it was the basis for the reforms that Madrid needed, and they spoke of the shopkeepers as members of a class that was being manipulated for election purposes⁵². Moreover, they condemned the demonstrations and the permissiveness shown by the authorities towards the organizers, as it was unfair treatment when compared to the demonstrations normally organized by the working class⁵³.

The Socialists knew the dynastic front would use the issue of the tax and would criticize the municipal authorities as the main weapons of their campaign⁵⁴. Therefore, one of the strategies they followed was to detail the most favorable aspects of the municipal action program developed till then and that could still be implemented in the future. The first thing that needed doing was to explain the progress that the works would entail for Madrid, financed by the loan and the tax. The funds arising from them would help reorganize a very deficient cleaning service, disinfection service and that of the Laboratorio Municipal, it would allow to carry out new work in the construction of the slaughterhouse and the cemetery in the East, the cleaning up of the subsoil and the execution of paving and urban works in the worst areas of the city (neighborhoods south of the city center and the most impoverished

⁴⁹ ABC, 16 March, 1923.

⁵⁰ *La Correspondencia de España*, 17 March, 1923.

⁵¹ *Heraldo de Madrid*, 26 March, 1923.

⁵² AVM, LAAM, municipal session held on the 26th of March, 1922.

⁵³ *El Socialista*, 27 March, 1923.

⁵⁴ "La décima y las elecciones", *El Socialista*, 7 April, 1923.

areas of Extra radio, such as Cuatro Caminos, Bellas Vistas, Guindalera, Prosperidad and San Isidro)⁵⁵.

At that time, Madrid's Socialism also understood as a pressing need the annexation of the city's bordering villages, key to improve their infrastructures and public services and correct their huge hygiene-sanitary conditions⁵⁶. In turn, the urban development of Extra radio by executing the Núñez Granés plan still appeared in the horizon as the main way out given the lack of housing, and it was the way in which Madrid's municipality could meet the needs of a population that was getting closer to one million souls⁵⁷.

New proposals were also added to the council in order to solve some of the main urban problems. Saborit was one of the most active members, planning the improvement of tasks carried out until then by veterinarians of municipal sanitary inspections to avoid the introduction of adulterated milk, the execution of settlement works in the southern periphery neighborhoods, reforming some shelter houses and establishing new services, including a public market and gardens in the neighborhood of Puente de Segovia⁵⁸. He was also committed with the execution of improvement works in the district of Universidad, especially in the neighborhoods Bellas Vistas and Vallehermoso: fixing the paving, placing pavements and installing a sewage system that would reduce the degree of deterioration of those areas, reforming schools in some of the most disadvantaged neighborhoods of Madrid and building underground lavatories⁵⁹.

At the same time, the Socialists continued to bring to public attention the scandals committed in the council. Cordero used the weeks leading up to the vote to intensify the inspection tasks on the sale of bread and to verify that they were still of lower weight than expected in a huge proportion of cases, with the acquiescence of the local authorities and dynastic councilors. The socialist candidate sent a letter to the Civil Governor for the

⁵⁵ "Las obras que irán en el empréstito", *El Socialista*, 12 April, 1923.

⁵⁶ "Mitin en el Puente de Vallecas", *El Socialista*, 29 March, 1923.

⁵⁷ Julián BESTEIRO, "Mientras discuten los técnicos. El proyecto de urbanización del Extrarradio", *El Imparcial*, 20 March, 1923; G. FERNÁNDEZ, "El problema de la urbanización del Extrarradio", *El Imparcial*, 29 March, 1923; Julián BESTEIRO, "La construcción y administración de las viviendas", *El Imparcial*, 3 April, 1923; "En el Ayuntamiento se ocuparán dentro de poco del problema de las viviendas", *La Voz*, 11 April, 1923; "La urbanización del extrarradio y el problema de la vivienda", *El Socialista*, 16 April, 1923.

⁵⁸ "Tres proposiciones", *El Socialista*, 2 April, 1923; "Proposiciones socialistas", *El Socialista*, 10 April, 1923.

⁵⁹ "Grupo Escolar de las Peñuelas", *El Socialista*, 13 April, 1923; "Mejoras en el distrito de la Universidad", *El Socialista*, 17 April, 1923 and "Evacuarios subterráneos", *El Socialista*, 20 April, 1923.

province of Madrid giving full details of the bakeries that violated the rules established by the municipal regulations and giving information about the kilograms of bread that he had seized in just two days (1,520.50 in the whole of Madrid)⁶⁰. The monarchist press believed that Cordero was increasing his efforts to inspect bread for election purposes⁶¹, but his objective was to impose fines on the shops that incurred in those fouls and replace the city council's employees and senior positions who turned a blind eye on those misconducts⁶². Something similar could be said about the cemeteries of Patriarcal and San Justo, also inspected by Cordero. The councilor brought to light their shameful state of deterioration, especially the former one, with collapsed walls and coffins on top of coffins. Putting an end to that horrendous scenario was key in order to improve the quality of life of the citizens of Vallehermoso and to achieve the natural expansion of the district of Universidad, blocked by that cemetery⁶³.

Finally, the election campaign was also the ideal context In order to focus on the complaints being made in the previous months regarding the economic abuses committed by the companies operating certain services in Madrid (electricity companies installing the meters and increasing the electricity price, the underground company in the execution of works and private undertakers, which led to many requests to municipalize those services) and the bad hygiene-health situation in some key institutions in order to improve the quality of life of the population (childcare and elderly care institutions, and other facilities linked to charity and social care)⁶⁴.

The dissemination of the most relevant characteristics of socialist municipal political actions in the campaign was done at the same time as highlighting the most important national objectives of the party. As well as ideas propaganda, there was the need to condemn the existing social and political regime, focusing on the events of the preceding years and the abominable response by the governments. First, the conflict that came up in Barcelona due to the social and economic transformation caused by the Great War, which

⁶⁰ *El Socialista*, 3 April, 1923.

⁶¹ *El Sol y La Voz*, 3 April, 1923.

⁶² "Concupiscencia y confabulación. Las autoridades municipales de real orden acuerdan tolerar el robo en el peso del pan", *El Socialista*, 3 April, 1923; "El escándalo de las gratificaciones", *El Socialista*, 12 April, 1923.

⁶³ "Los escándalos de los cementerios de la Patriarcal y San Justo", *El Socialista*, 10 April, 1923.

⁶⁴ AVM, LAAM, municipal session held on the 26th of April, 1922.

favored the appearance of an anarchist unionism, fought by the authorities with military repression⁶⁵. Secondly, the dramatic economic situation of a country indebted since the end of the global conflict. And finally, the fault of the government and the high military ranks in the disasters of Annual, Nador and Monte Arruit⁶⁶.

In the rallies and conferences held during the election campaign, the socialist candidates studied in depth the responsibilities for the Battle of Annual. The main starting points were the conference given by Indalecio Prieto at Ateneo de Madrid on the 7th of April, and the opening socialist assertion rally on the 14th of April in Casa del Pueblo⁶⁷. PSOE's criteria in this sense was based on the main items mentioned previously by their parliamentary minority: distancing from the army Division General Dámaso Berenguer, Brigade General Felipe Navarro and the Colonels of the platoons posted to the General Command of Melilla who were present in the region when the withdrawal in Annual started; accountability of the governments of Manuel Allendesalazar and Antonio Maura; prohibition for the Army's Court of Honor to decide by itself the penalties for the facts that led to the crime: the immediate closing of the country's military academies; dissolution of the Military Intendancy body and repealing the Law of Jurisdiction⁶⁸. The socialist candidacy presented as its main campaign thesis abandoning the Moroccan effort with the demand to correct the military policies followed until then, focusing their programme on demanding accountability to the highest levels as it was the only possible guarantee to start a satisfactory change in the government procedures⁶⁹.

Finally, the socialist election campaign stood out because of the harsh attacks orchestrated against the Maurists and the Republicans. When punishing the former, they

⁶⁵ Albert BALCELLS: *El pistolero. Barcelona (1917-1923)*, Barcelona, Pòrtic, 2009.

⁶⁶ These general objectives can be found in: AASM, 507-10, Manifest of Agrupación Socialista Madrileña regarding the 1st of May, 1923. As for the historiographic treatment of those issues (including the socialist position), please refer to: Antonio MORENO: "El Socialista y el desastre de Annual: opinión y actitud socialista ante la derrota", *Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea*, vol. 12, 1990, pages 103-132; Rosa María MADARIAGA: *España y el Rif. Crónica de una historia casi olvidada*, Melilla, UNED, 1998; Juan PANDO: *Historia secreta de Annual*, Madrid, Temas de Hoy, 1999; Patricio de BLAS and Eva de BLAS: *Nadar contra corriente. Julián Besteiro*, Madrid, Algaba, 2003, pags 192-201.

⁶⁷ *El Socialista*, 10 and 16 April, 1922. The impact of the figure of Prieto denouncing the military campaign in Morocco in: Indalecio PRIETO: *El desastre de Melilla: dictamen de la minoría socialista. Discurso de Indalecio Prieto pronunciado en el Congreso de los Diputados los días 21 y 22 de noviembre de 1922*, Madrid, Sucesores de Rivadeneyra, 1922.

⁶⁸ "La acusación socialista en el Parlamento", *El Socialista*, 26 April, 1923.

⁶⁹ "Los candidatos a la opinión", *El Socialista*, 26 April, 1923.

once again made comments about episodes that had worked as election gains in other occasions, either the executions in Montjuich after the Tragic Week, Maura's responsibility for starting the military campaign in Morocco, and the measures developed by him during his long mandate in order to repress the ASM's protests. They did not leave out the fascist trends seen at the core of the movement⁷⁰, which could no longer be considered the champion of achieving the melting of the regime and the revolution from the top (concepts that had been included in their doctrines since the end of 1913)⁷¹, and the strategies practiced during the campaign through bribes and vote-buying in the outskirts' neighborhoods⁷².

Regarding the Republican candidacy, socialist condemnation was based on Lerroux' potential desire to obtain certain government economic support in order to set up a minority in the opposition⁷³. The ASM benefited from the malaise generated by the candidacy of Lerroux amongst the federal candidates, who decided to call an assembly to present the strategies to follow for the election⁷⁴. Practically reduced to a minimum political expression in Madrid, the alternatives discussed were either presenting their own candidacy, or withdrawing. The federal assembly held on the 20th of April helped to totally reject the list established by Lerroux' stamp, and gave total freedom to the party members to vote for other similar parties, specifying that this could not be done with the official Republican candidacy nor with the monarchist one. In this manner, the federalists implicitly gave their support to the socialist list for the election of the 29th of April⁷⁵.

THE TERRITORIAL REPRESENTATION OF THE SOCIALIST VICTORY IN 1923

Nationally, the election of the 29th of April 1923 showed the persistence of the traditional tyranny methods, with the prior discontinuation of mayors and councilors and the

⁷⁰ Javier TUSELL and Juan AVILÉS: *La derecha española contemporánea. Sus orígenes: el maurismo*, Madrid, Espasa Calpe, 1986, pags 281-286.

⁷¹ Julián BESTEIRO: "Democracia y Dictadura. El fascio, la traza y la facha", *El Socialista*, 12 April, 1923.

⁷² *El Socialista*, 30 April, 1923 and 2 May, 1923.

⁷³ "La candidatura republicana por Madrid, *El Socialista*, 14 April, 1923.

⁷⁴ "Los federales de Madrid y la candidatura republicana", *El Socialista*, 20 April, 1923.


⁷⁵ *El Socialista*, 24 April, 1923.

direct proclamation of 146 parliamentarians as per article 29 of the Electoral Law of 1907⁷⁶. According to what was stated by the press, the most significant results of that general election were the results in Madrid, after analyzing them we can draw several interesting conclusions. The first one has to do with participation in the election. An isolated analysis of the election would confirm the general apathy referred to by the newspapers, more apparent in districts with higher numbers of working class people⁷⁷. In those areas, the average votes for the city were not even met, abstentions in areas with a high representation of the working classes was a trait of the election.

A long-term analysis bearing in mind all the elections held in Madrid since the Electoral Law of 1907 allows us to see growing discouragement amongst the population regarding the possibility to change the political situation with votes. However, when comparing this election with the previous one, there are some nuances to that conclusion for working districts. The increase of participation in Hospital, Latina, Inclusa, Chamberí and Universidad was clearly higher than that observed in well-off districts, except for Centro, due to the mobilization of traders. In this sense, the socialist candidacy had a relative victory in awakening the interest among those social sectors that in 1920 did not choose to participate in the indirect intervention in the political system.

⁷⁶ Miguel MARTÍNEZ CUADRADO, *Elecciones y partidos políticos, 1868-1931*, vol. II, Madrid, Taurus, 1969, pags 839-845.

⁷⁷ *Heraldo de Madrid, La Voz, El Sol, El Imparcial and El Liberal*, 30 April and 1 May 1923.

Figure 5. Percentages of participation in the elections in Madrid (1910-1923)

Source: Archive of Villa de Madrid, Secretariat (AVM-S), electoral reports of 1910, 1914, 1916, 1918, 1919, 1920 and 1923

The second conclusion comes from the analysis of the results for the socialist candidacy and the fact that Largo Caballero did not get a seat. The fact that Sacristán obtained a seat was to be expected, given the support he obtained in districts with a more commercial profile (Centro, Congreso and Hospicio). More difficult to understand are the two other seats obtained by the Ministerial to the detriment of the Socialist candidate, which at the time was explained by the party's press office as the lack of discipline of the workers' groups, who removed his name from the candidacy paper⁷⁸. Despite that, the fewer votes received by Largo Caballero could also be explained by analyzing in detail the Republican results. Roberto Castrovido appears with significantly more votes than his other colleagues on the list, and in this sense it could be assumed that his name could have replaced that of Largo Caballero in a significant number of ballot papers. More so when we bear in mind the favorable opinions he had of Madrid's Socialism during the campaign⁷⁹.

The third main conclusion after examining the election is the clear defeat of the Republican party. The size of that defeat was similar to that of the election of December 1920, in which Lerroux obtained over 8,000 votes less than the first name on the Socialist list. The republican factions were being penalized in the ballot boxes due to increasingly more timorous municipal representations, an internal organization of committees and clubs that had lost importance, and an organization and structure that was old-fashioned when compared to the Socialists. Republicanism had sunk in discredit, abandoned by the working masses that previously voted for it in the working class districts and unable to become a party that represented the middle class. To all of that, we must add the weakness shown by its parliamentarians in the accountability discussions in the previous mandate⁸⁰.

This last global conclusion leads us to assess the results of the monarchist candidacies. It seems that the separation between the Ministerial and the Maurists was decisive⁸¹. Adding the votes of their candidates would have led to a victory similar to that of 1920. It is possible to observe that the recent closeness between Maura and Mussolini's

⁷⁸ *El Socialista*, 30 April, 1923.

⁷⁹ "Lo que opina Castrovido", *El Socialista*, 3 May, 1923.

⁸⁰ *La Voz*, 30 April. 1923; *El Socialista*, 30 April, 1923 and *La Correspondencia de España*, 30 April, 1923.

⁸¹ Divisions between Maurism supporters and Ministerial in: *La Acción*, *El Debate* y *ABC*, 10, 29 April, 1923.

doctrines played a key role in his loss of votes, adding to that Ossorio's separation⁸². We can see in *El Debate* and even more so in *La Acción* that orthodox Maurism experimented in the months before the election a radicalization, proof of which were many paramilitary-like requests to redirect the country and establish a political system that could overcome the government's ineffectiveness⁸³. Despite those arguments, the figures speak for themselves. Just one year earlier, the movement sang in Madrid its swan song during the holding of a municipal election in which they obtained ten councilor positions. In just a few months, they lost the social support they had obtained since 1913⁸⁴.

But explaining the election results requires making a deeper analysis per neighborhood and electoral section in order to understand the real reasons of citizens when voting. Interpretation exercises on any election must go beyond establishing a mere dichotomy between middle class districts, favorable to Monarchy policies, and working class districts, keener on voting left-wing parties. After initially looking at the general results, this would be the first conclusion we could draw. The Socialists won comfortably in districts with a strong concentration of working class citizens (Chamberí, Universidad, Inclusa, Hospital and Latina). Monarchists-Mercantile won in a similar proportion in mainly middle to high class districts (Centro, Hospicio, Congreso and Palacio). Finally, we have the district of Buenavista, whose aristocratic condition traditionally justified its support for Maurism.

⁸² Javier TUSELL and Juan AVILÉS: *La derecha española contemporánea...* op. cit., pags 257-294, María Jesús GONZÁLEZ: *Ciudadanía y acción. El conservadurismo maurista, 1907-1923*, Madrid, Siglo XXI, 1998; Antonio M. LÓPEZ: *Ángel Ossorio y Gallardo. Biografía política de un conservador heterodoxo*, Madrid, Ed. Reus, 2017.

⁸³ *El Debate*, 1 April, 1923 and *La Acción*, 28 and 30 April, 1923.


⁸⁴ Santiago DE MIGUEL: "La eclosión del maurismo en una ciudad en proceso de bipolarización política. Madrid, 1913-1917", *Aportes. Revista de Historia Contemporánea*, vol. 32, nº 93, 2017, pags 65-103.

Table 2. Results of the April 1923 election in Madrid

Candidatos	CENTRO	HOSPICIO	CHAMBERI	BUENAVENTURA	CONGRESO	HOSPITAL	LATINA	INCLUSA	PALACIO	UNIVERSIDAD	TOTAL
Julián Besteiro (PSOE)	1.026	1.485	2.848	1.696	1.658	2.920	2.946	2.606	1.492	2.860	21.537
Pablo Iglesias (PSOE)	1.018	1.502	2.858	1.653	1.608	2.921	2.918	2.590	1.473	2.863	21.404
Manuel Cordero (PSOE)	994	1.436	2.782	1.637	1.592	2.918	2.924	2.652	1.463	2.768	21.166
Antonio Sacristán (M-M)	2.546	2.280	1.931	2.180	2.558	1.645	1.894	1.578	2.248	1.789	20.649
Fernando de los Ríos (PSOE)	899	1.306	2.652	1.574	1.480	2.778	2.738	2.503	1.322	2.682	19.934
Andrés Saborit (PSOE)	880	1.290	2.596	1.535	1.400	2.776	2.764	2.487	1.345	2.657	19.730
Francisco García Molinas (M-M)	1.972	2.079	1.920	2.112	2.238	1.591	1.703	1.428	2.361	1.759	19.163
Francisco Álvarez Rodríguez Villamil (M-M)	2.029	1.919	1.848	1.889	2.295	1.603	1.880	1.482	2.250	1.796	18.991
Francisco Largo Caballero (PSOE)	793	1.184	2.510	1.460	1.330	2.677	2.616	2.406	1.259	2.511	18.746
Luis Garrido Juaristi (M-M)	1.879	1.987	1.892	1.927	2.266	1.561	1.785	1.468	2.221	1.738	18.724
José Álvarez Arranz (M-M)	1.928	1.935	1.762	1.959	2.252	1.489	1.715	1.401	2.310	1.663	18.414
Emilio Blanco Parrondo (M-M)	1.802	1.759	1.662	1.717	2.043	1.517	1.859	1.440	2.235	1.724	17.758
Alfredo Serrano Jover (MAU)	1.389	1.608	1.462	2.480	1.684	1.165	1.281	1.053	1.753	1.377	15.252
Antonio Goicoechea (MAU)	1.298	1.626	1.534	2.468	1.640	1.151	1.262	1.070	1.629	1.276	14.954
Luis López Doriga (MAU)	1.178	1.437	1.361	2.405	1.535	1.186	1.199	1.020	1.486	1.199	14.006
Ramón del Rivero (MAU)	1.155	1.429	1.343	2.383	1.476	1.043	1.152	999	1.461	1.217	13.658
Miguel Colom (MAU)	1.040	1.368	1.311	2.223	1.421	1.023	1.115	997	1.414	1.126	13.038
Antonio Conrado (MAU)	1.072	1.307	1.277	2.285	1.416	1.027	1.093	962	1.426	1.069	12.934
Roberto Castrovidrio (REP)	1.118	1.404	1.331	1.030	1.273	1.191	1.549	937	798	1.159	11.790
Emilio Menéndez Pallarés (REP)	900	1.015	1.090	887	1.045	1.035	1.332	821	627	942	9.694
Rafael Salillas (REP)	704	825	934	763	865	928	1.256	740	529	819	8.363
Gabriel Montero (REP)	756	805	888	701	864	933	1.202	731	511	736	8.127
Adolfo Álvarez Buylla (REP)	678	800	900	716	859	878	1.211	696	512	773	8.023
Antonio Jaén (REP)	618	697	795	614	758	818	1.179	668	442	663	7.252
José María Viñuelas (PC)	123	115	353	182	121	311	449	363	112	352	2.481
Óscar Pérez Solís (PC)	87	69	216	122	91	223	253	236	81	242	1.620
Manuel Núñez Arenas (PC)	76	60	203	124	76	221	256	235	72	236	1.559
Ramón Lamonedo (PC)	68	60	207	117	62	201	219	221	72	233	1.460
Antonio García Quejido (PC)	63	43	183	107	58	180	221	204	63	216	1.338
Isidoro Rodríguez (PC)	59	46	180	106	59	182	221	216	59	208	1.336
Votos en blanco	154	247	278	189	231	194	191	20	167	194	1.865
Votos emitidos	5.928	6.579	7.967	7.620	7.200	7.321	8.258	6.617	6.687	7.617	71.794


Footnotes (M-M): Monarchist-Mercantile; (PSOE): Socialist; (MAU): Maurist; (REP): Republican and (PC): Communist. Source: AVM-S, call numbers 22-251-1 to 22-254-2

Figure 6. Voting trends in Madrid per municipal district in 1923



Source: AVM-S, 22-251-1 to 22-254-2

Figure 7. Classification of the election sections for the districts of Madrid according to political orientation in the 29th of April 1923 election.



Source: AVM-S, 22-251-1 to 22-254-2

An analysis per electoral section in each district allows us to fine-tune the interpretation of the results. Sacristán was very relevant in Centro district, an area characterized by a large convergence of traders⁸⁵. His higher vote percentages came from sections that typically have a higher concentration of workers from the traditional services sector. Those were the cases of section 9, which included the main financial areas of Madrid and that of services, between Puerta del Sol and the convergence of Sevilla street with Plaza de Canalejas; section 13, defined as the area with the largest amount of more modest commercial and industrial premises (Plaza Mayor and surrounding area); and section 17, mainly calle del Arenal and streets close by, with higher social and economic profiles than the previous ones.

The biggest percentages of Socialist vote only reached 25%, and they were especially in sections where there was a greater degree of abstentions, such as sections 2 and 3. The former included secondary and smaller streets in the southern borders of the district, close to calle de San Bernardo. The latter includes perpendicular roads to the spectacular Gran Via, with a social landscape similar to that of the 21st century. They were areas where Socialism could form a more robust political clientele, mainly among day labourers, qualified manual workers and poorly paid services sector employees. Despite all that, Castrovido obtained more votes than Besteiro, showing that, even during their acute crisis, Republicanism still obtained better results than Socialism in areas characterized by a greater presence of trade bourgeoisie.

⁸⁵ Santiago DE MIGUEL: *Madrid, sinfonía de una metrópoli europea, 1860-1936*, Madrid, Catarata, 2016.

Table 3. Social and professional profiles of those who voted and abstained in section 3 of Centro (calle de Silva, calle de Tudescos and callejón de Tudescos)

Social and professional category	No.	%	Votes	Abstentions
Liberal professionals and technicians	36	7.29%	18	18
Administrative and management workers	2	0.40%	0	2
Office workers and civil servants	83	16.80%	46	37
Sales people	75	15.18%	40	35
Service sector workers	57	11.54%	25	32
Farmers and forestry sector workers	5	1.01%	0	5
Production and transport workers	210	42.51%	100	110
No profession mentioned	26	5.26%	14	12
Total	494	100%	243	251
Day labourers and non-qualified workers	125	25.30%	58	67

Source: AVM-S, 22-254-2.

In Hospicio, the victory was also for the monarchist-mercantile candidacy, although less clearly than in the previous case due to slight increases in republican, socialist and maurist votes. The largest amount of ministerial votes only reached close to 50% in sections 7, 9 and 11. The first one stood out for including a large sector of middle class traders, given that it included a large section of Calle de Hortaleza. The second one included a good section of Calle de Alcalá (the one devoted mainly to banks, with representatives from the sector among its residents) and a good part of the first section of Gran Vía (Avenida del Conde de Peñalver) and nearby streets with mid to high rental prices. The third area was the street continuation of Gran Via towards Calle de Barquillo and surrounding area, with similar social profiles among its voters. Only five sections of the district escaped from the monarchist control. Sections 2, 17, 18, 20 and 24 include secondary and smaller streets from the north of the city centre. They were the main source of socialist votes, which in the best of cases received over 30% of the votes. They were urban spaces similar to the leftist ones in Centro, although with less specialized commercial activity.

Table 4. Social and professional profiles of those who voted and abstained in section 24 of Hospicio (calle del Barco 14 to 34, calle del Escorial and calle de Santa Bárbara)

Social and professional category	No.	%	Votes	Abstentions
Liberal professionals and technicians	35	9.19%	19	16
Administrative and management workers	0	0%	0	0
Office workers and civil servants	59	15.49%	34	25
Sales people	42	11.02%	24	18
Service sector workers	36	9.45%	19	17
Farmers and forestry sector workers	0	0%	0	0
Production and transport workers	199	52.23%	104	95
No profession mentioned	10	2.62%	3	7
Total	381	100%	203	178
Day labourers and non-qualified workers	153	40.16%	79	74

Source: AVM-S, 22-254-2.

The third district with very similar results in terms of social support to the candidacies was that of Congreso. Most of its neighborhoods were in the old city, in an area where dynastic parties and their old-standing loyal clientele were guaranteed, but it grew exponentially in the area of Ensanche and, above all, in Extrarradio. The neighborhoods of Gutenberg and Plaza de Toros contained the sections that were more prone to a left-wing vote.

Gutenberg had become an area with a large working class, linked to the railway and with a significant presence of warehouses and factories. In 1923, many modest traders and low-qualification employees who worked for the services sector also lived there. In turn, Plaza de Toros was an area that did not portray the typical ambience of a city in the process of modernization due to the huge amount of tile factories, shacks and non-paved streets, attractive for modest families⁸⁶. From the former neighborhood came the best results for the socialist candidacy. It obtained over 40% of the votes in sections that included some of the most disadvantaged streets, with lower rental prices, mid-way between Pacífico and the outskirts of Puente de Vallecas (sections 6, 19 and 20). In Plaza de Toros sections they obtained votes close to 40%, although they were overtaken by votes for the Monarchist-

⁸⁶ Borja CARBALLO, *El Ensanche Este. Salamanca-Retiro 1860-1931. El Madrid burgués*, Madrid, Catarata, 2015.

Mercantile. The scenario observed when looking at the votes cast in this area were better than those of the wealthiest areas of the city center, where the candidacy did not obtain over 15% of the votes (especially in areas that had been highlighted as being the main keeps of Maurism in previous years, such as the areas close to Puerta de Alcalá and Floridablanca, around the parliament).

Table 5. Social and professional profiles of those who voted and abstained in section 19 of Congreso (calles Arregui and Arrej, Francisco Abril, Los Mesejo, Luis Mitjans, Pacífico (31 till the end), Porvenir, Puente de Vallecas, Iriguet and Tejares de Asmesto, La Basilisa and Valeria)

Social and professional category	No.	%	Votes	Abstentions
Liberal professionals and technicians	20	4.05%	6	14
Administrative and management workers	1	0.20%	1	0
Office workers and civil servants	35	7.09%	19	16
Sales people	28	5.67%	16	12
Service sector workers	43	8.70%	28	15
Farmers and forestry sector workers	0	0%	0	0
Production and transport workers	343	69.43%	157	186
No profession mentioned	24	4.86%	10	14
Total	494	100%	237	257
Day laborers and non-qualified workers	266	53.85%	125	141

Source: AVM-S, 22-254-2.

The district of Palacio in principle presented a similar scenario to the three areas mentioned before. However, contrary to what happened in Centro, Hospicio and Congreso, where we can observe the great influence of the propaganda done by Sacristán, receiving the support of the members of his class, in Palacio the loyal vote remained indelible. Sacristán was not the most voted candidate in the list, rather the Romanonist Francisco García Molinas.

Palacio was a district whose sector that belonged to the city center was characterized for having many residents who were state, municipal and monarchy employees. It is not surprising that the sections including some of the main areas of the neighborhoods of Senado, Isabel II and Carlos III (located between Plaza de España, Palacio Real and the areas around Plaza de la Ópera and calle del Arenal) reflected higher percentages of votes

for the Monarchist-Mercantile candidacy. Those spaces were precisely the ones that showed higher participation rates in the whole city (close to 60%), which showed the perseverance of official influence.

The areas of Palacio where Socialism had greater support were mainly of two types. On the one hand, the Socialists had more votes in sections of the city center that included small streets with a strong presence of day laborers and manual worker families with some qualification (back of the Senate with buildings characterized for presenting some of the lowest rental prices in the area and streets that led to Calle de San Bernardo around Plaza de los Mostenses, very working class areas). On the other hand, the higher percentages of votes came from sections 21 (44.23%) and 22 (37.77%), belonging to Extra radio in the area of Casa de Campo.

Table 6. Social and profesional profiles of those who voted and abstained in section 21 of Palacio (Casa de Campo, Comandante Fortea, Marqués del Monistrol, Plaza del Puente Segovia, Pradera del Corregidor, Fuente de la Teja, Paseo Virgen del Puerto and Porvenir)

Social and professional category	No.	%	Votes	Abstentions
Liberal professionals and technicians	10	2.02%	2	8
Administrative and management workers	0	0%	0	0
Office workers and civil servants	37	7.47%	18	19
Sales people	30	6.06%	16	14
Service sector workers	17	3.43%	10	7
Farmers and forestry sector workers	0	0%	0	0
Production and transport workers	385	77.78%	150	235
No profession mentioned	18	3.64%	8	10
Total	495	100%	204	293
Day labourers and non-qualified workers	344	69.49%	131	213

Source: AVM-S, 22-254-2.

Section 21 was one of the few that recorded incidents during the voting session, due to the breaking of a ballot box by a Republican inspector as a sign of protest given the actions of the chairman of the polling station who fraudulently introduced votes in the ballot

boxes⁸⁷. The results were, to say the least, confusing. In a space taken over by day laborers, mixed with a handful of low-qualification manual workers (builder assistants, carpenters, locksmiths, mechanics and bookbinders), the vote variations amongst monarchist candidates were high. Whilst Francisco Álvarez Rodríguez Villamil received 103 votes, Sacristán and Garrido Juaristi only surpassed a dozen each. Moreover, this was one of the few sections in Madrid where there was uniformity of votes amongst members of the Socialist list. There were only two votes difference between Cordero (94) and Largo Caballero (92). The same scenario was seen in section 22, which included many streets with working class residents such as Paseo de Extremadura and Puerta del Ángel, which means the Socialist vote division did not take place there.

It is possible that Buenavista was the most peculiar district of those analyzed here, as it was the only constituency where the maurist candidacy won. This result was due to the intense activity the movement carried out in the area since its creation, with the convergence of their social bases and of some internal bodies (committees, circles, workers' training centers). This meant that there was a clear political trend of modern conservatism in the sections capitalized by the social elites. Here we could find neighborhoods such as Fernando el Santo, which included some of the most expensive and luxurious streets in Madrid at that time (Fortuny, Monte Esquinza, Zurbarán, Zurbano, the initial part of Paseo de la Castellana and part of calle de Almagro). All of them joined in section 5, where the Maurists obtained 47.37% of the votes cast. Those who appeared in the lists of that area were mainly highly specialized liberal professionals, such as engineers, architects, lawyers, magistrates and diplomats.

The trends of the maurist vote were also present in other wealthy areas such as Ensanche Este (Biblioteca, Marqués de Salamanca, Conde de Aranda and Monasterio), but they totally disappeared in the sections of the Extra radio's (Guindalera, Prosperidad and Las Mercedes). The percentages of Socialist votes swung between 35% and 50% in areas where the ASM had carried out very intense propaganda during the campaign, by recruiting inspectors and holding rallies and conferences. Section 25 may represent the paradigmatic example of the support that the Socialists could obtain in that district, which included most streets contained within the borders of Príncipe de Vergara, Avenida de América, López de

⁸⁷ *La Correspondencia de España, La Voz, Heraldo de Madrid*, 30 April and 1 May, 1923.

Hoyos and Canillas. Socialism's political clientele in this area, where it obtained 48.12% of the votes (with high participation, showing a large degree of social mobilization), was made up by masses of day laborers together with manual workers from different industries (typographers, bookbinders, tram drivers, carpenters, painters, electricians, lathe operators and tailors).

Contrary to the five districts before, Chamberí and Universidad, in the north of the city center and Ensanche, and Latina, Hospital and Inclusa, in the south, gave a firm support to the Socialist candidacy. In the first case, they obtained the majority in 29 of the 33 sections. That was the case even in city center neighborhoods such as Monteleón and Dos de Mayo, where the Dynastic parties used to have their clientele more secured. Compared to other districts, it was Iglesias, not Besteiro, who achieved the largest number of votes, giving us an idea of the support the party had in those areas, despite the fact that the socialist leader had been distanced from the propaganda throughout the campaign⁸⁸.

Moving towards the north of this district was synonymous of an important increase in the percentages of Socialist votes, although Cuatro Caminos was where the highest support was found. From the beginning of the 20th century, this zone represented the main socialist bastion in Madrid. Starting from zero in terms of election history, the Socialists started sinking in in the political culture of its inhabitants, championing their interests from the city council, mobilizing people in times of social protests and establishing a constant communication about their manifestos in rallies and conferences. There we could also find the offices of the Cooperativa Socialista Madrileña (Madrid's Socialist Cooperative) and of the Círculo Socialista del Norte (Socialist circle of the North), which, at times of election, became the main hubs of the district commission, in charge of collecting questions and queries from fellow socialists and supporters. Sections 23, 25, 27 and 29 belonged to that neighborhood and were considered to be loyal territories for the Socialist, with voting percentages higher than 50%. Moreover, they were areas where the party carried out an intense service amongst their members to avoid vote buying⁸⁹

⁸⁸ Rubén PALLOL: *El Madrid moderno: Chamberí (el Ensanche Norte), símbolo del nacimiento de una nueva capital, 1860-1931*, Madrid, Tesis Doctoral, UCM, 2009.

⁸⁹ *La Correspondencia de España*, 30 April, 1923.

Table 7. Social and professional profiles of those who vote and abstained in section 27 of Chamberí (calles de Bravo Murillo 22 to 48, Felipe el Hermoso, García de Paredes 1 to 15 and 2 to 24, Marqués de la Romana, Medellín, Santísima Trinidad and Zarzal)

Social and professional category	No.	%	Votes	Abstentions
Liberal professionals and technicians	18	3.69%	5	13
Administrative and management workers	2	0.41%	1	1
Office workers and civil servants	49	10.04%	33	16
Sales people	29	5.94%	16	13
Service sector workers	39	7.99%	24	15
Farmers and forestry sector workers	1	0.20%	0	1
Production and transport workers	322	65.98%	152	170
No profession mentioned	28	5.74%	11	17
Total	488	100%	242	246
Day labourers and non-qualified workers	227	46.52%	102	125

Source: AVM-S, 22-254-2.

Universidad was another district where there was a clear Socialist enthusiasm. Only three sections - 8, 12 and 31 - gave a greater number of votes for the Monarchist-Mercantile candidacy. They were sectors from the city center where, despite the fact that Socialism advanced gradually in terms of social support, did not manage to fully break down the clientele networks of dynastic parties (around streets such as Pez, San Bernardo, Princesa and Alberto Aguilera). Just like in Chamberí, moving from those neighborhoods from the city center to Extra radio, past areas in Ensanche Norte, raised the percentage of votes above 50%. Bellas Vistas was the main bag of votes for the candidacy. A zone where the party's militants had gradually been growing for 15 years, because it was a key location for the holding of rallies and election conferences, or simply for information conferences and due to the improvement initiatives that Socialist councilors in the previous periods made (opening up of schools, closing of non-hygienic clandestine slaughterhouses, listening to the demands to reduce tram prices). Section 25 was the best example of the social rooting of the party, reaching 57.06% of the votes cast.

Table 8. Social and economic profiles of those who voted and abstained in section 25 of Universidad (calle de Adrián Pulido, Alejandro Rodríguez, Castilla, Francisco Salas, Juan Pradillo, María Pedraza, Manuel Pradillo, Marianela, Ondrid, Proletarios, Rafael Herreros and Wad Ras)

Social and professional category	No.	%	Votes	Abstentions
Liberal professionals and technicians	3	0.69%	0	3
Administrative and management workers	0	0%	0	0
Office workers and civil servants	21	4.86%	11	10
Sales people	16	3.70%	12	4
Service sector workers	17	3.94%	7	10
Farmers and forestry sector workers	0	0%	0	0
Production and transport workers	363	84.03%	135	228
No profession mentioned	12	2.78%	4	8
Total	432	100%	169	263
Day labourers and non-qualified workers	298	68.98%	104	194

Source: AVM-S, 22-254-2.

Separate mention must be given to the results of Hospital, Inclusa and Latina. The move from Republicanism to Socialism in those areas started happening some time before due to the unity crisis suffered by the former and the initiatives of the latter in terms of neighborhood improvement, including the creation of the Círculo Socialista del Sur (Socialist Circle of the South) as a body that advanced in the process of political socialization. They clearly overtook the Republicans in the municipal and general elections held in February and December of 1920 respectively. In the latter ones, they doubled the amount of republican votes in Hospital and Latina and trebled them in Inclusa. Two and a half years later, the distances grew larger. Even the Maurists overtook the Republicans, despite having renounced years earlier to obtaining votes from there after several unsuccessful attempts to generate social bases there.

In Inclusa, the socialist victory came in the hands of Cordero in the campaign. His success can only be explained from an urban perspective and because of the activities he developed as deputy mayor of the districts during the previous years. His constant inspection campaign to avoid food fraud and the demands he made to fix the terrible hygiene-sanitary conditions of those streets gained him greater social support.

Nevertheless, the district presented important nuances among its sections. The areas bordering Centro (neighborhoods of Duque de Alba and, to a lesser extent, Amazonas) showed clear similarities in the voting trends with the areas that were more devoted to traditional commercial activities of the first one (neighbourhoods Constitución and Correos).

In turn, the Socialists obtained the full control of the voters in the southern areas of the city center and Ensanche. In the first ones, the masses of day laborers and the few qualified craftsmen residing in working class neighborhoods such as Rastro, Cabestreros, Huerta del Bayo and the southern part of Amazonas voted for Cordero with the same intensity than twenty years before when they voted for the Republican Union in the district (especially the final sector of Calle del Amparo starting from Plaza de Lavapiés and surrounding areas, areas where they reported vote buying attempts from Ciervists candidate Alvarez Arranz). In the sections of Gasómetro and Peñuelas, in Ensanche, the situation was similar. More than five out of every ten voters who voted did so for the Socialists (Paseo de las Acacias, Ronda de Toledo, Peñuelas and Paseo de los Olmos, amongst other areas). The only sections where there were confusing results were those located in Extra radio (neighborhood of Marqués de Comillas). Despite the clear presence of day laborers, it was one of the areas where the monarchist-mercantile candidacy obtained greater social support. Bearing in mind the precedents of vote adulteration in previous elections, we could not rule out the use of influence and vote buying by the dynastic forces in an area clearly removed from the socialist trend of the periphery.

Table 9. Social and economic profiles of those who voted and abstained for Section 17 of the district of Inclusa (calles de Amparo no. 54 to 92) and Sombrerete (no. 7 y no.8 till the end of the street)

Social and professional category	No.	%	Votes	Abstentions
Liberal professionals and technicians	10	2.30%	7	3
Administrative and management workers	0	0%	0	0
Office workers and civil servants	35	8.05%	18	17
Sales people	13	2.99%	8	5
Service sector workers	12	2.76%	8	4
Farmers and forestry sector workers	0	0%	0	0
Production and transport workers	344	79.08%	173	171
No profession mentioned	21	4.83%	8	13
Total	435	100%	222	213
Day labourers and non-qualified workers	248	57.01%	123	125

Source: AVM-S, 22-254-2.

Due to the social and economic profiles of those neighborhoods and the propaganda activity and social mobilization strategies developed by the Socialists there, Hospital was a district that provided similar results to those of Inclusa, with the exception of Cordero's leadership due to the local influence, now replaced by Iglesias and Besteiro in the first positions. The socialist vote percentage generally was practically identical to that area (39.90%) although the victory was more complete (28 sections over a total of 31). The areas that were closer to the city of Centro and Congreso, with a greater proportion of members from the traditional commercial sector (section 1, 3 and 5 between the neighborhoods of Jesús y María, Ministriles and Torrecilla), provided good results for a monarchist-mercantile candidacy which had no option of victory in the district, as it was stated in the press⁹⁰.

Table 10. Social and professional profiles of those who voted and abstained in Section 26 of Hospital (calles de Bustamante, General Lacy numbers 2 to 10, Juan De Mariana, Méndez Álvaro odd numbers and 10 till the end of the street, Ramírez del Prado and Camino and Paseo de Yeseros)

Social and professional category	No.	%	Votes	Abstentions
Liberal professionals and technicians	3	0.63%	1	2
Administrative and management workers	1	0.21%	0	1
Office workers and civil servants	19	3.98%	11	8
Sales people	16	3.35%	10	6
Service sector workers	9	1.89%	5	4
Farmers and forestry sector workers	0	0%	0	0
Production and transport workers	422	88.47%	181	241
No profession mentioned	7	1.47%	6	1
Total	477	100%	214	263
Day labourers and non-qualified workers	372	77.99%	153	219

Source: AVM-S, 22-254-2.

Despite the lack of possibilities of dynastic success, Hospital recorded a significant number of incidents during the election. There were attempts of duplicated votes, casting of votes with fake names or with names of deceased people and, above all, bribery and vote buying, especially in the taverns of the southern neighborhoods of the center, subjected to

⁹⁰ *La Correspondencia de España*, 30 April, 1923.

intense inspection by the Socialists and Republicans⁹¹. After dismantling those wrongdoings, the Socialists had no problems winning in sections of neighborhoods such as Lavapiés, Argumosa, Doctor Fourquet and Primavera, although in the areas of Ensanche Sur they obtained their highest percentages. Those were the neighborhoods of Pacífico, the hub of Atocha's station, inhabited to a large extent by workers of the railway sector, and those of Delicias and Santa María de la Cabeza, still immersed in a process of revaluation of their properties and characterized by a huge convergence of immigrant families headed by day laborers and craftsmen on the verge of poverty⁹². In Section 26, near the station of Delicias, the Socialists reached nearly 60% of support amongst voters known for rarely stating their professional specialization, as well as railway workers, locksmiths, mechanics and carpenters.

To conclude, Latina was a district where the socialist candidacy also obtained an important victory, although not as conclusive as in Inclusa or Hospital. This difference was due to an increase in the number of votes for the Republican candidacy. Although Republicanism had totally lost its hegemony in this area, it still had some support in the working class of Humilladero and Cava, and in some sections of Calatrava and Aguas, defined by a high concentration of day laborers and low-specialization craftsmen who lived in cheap and overcrowded homes⁹³. In those areas, the percentages of votes for Castrovido could reach 23-30%, something that did not happen in other districts. In general, peaks in the trend of monarchist-mercantile votes and falls in the percentages of maurist, and above all, socialist votes accompanied the election behavior of the residents of those sections. Therefore, they could be seen as areas with a more old-fashioned urban political culture compared to others that had seen greater modernization over the last decade.

The support to the monarchist-mercantile candidacy increased in sections closer to the city center (Cava and Ayuntamiento), where the social profile was more heterogeneous, due to a larger presence of traders and employees mainly linked to the public administration of the municipality. In those areas the percentage of votes reached close to or even higher than 30% of the votes, whereas in the neighborhoods located more to the south there were

⁹¹ *El Liberal, El Imparcial, El Socialista, La Voz y Heraldo de Madrid*, 30 April and 1 May, 1923.

⁹² Fernando VICENTE: *El Ensanche Sur. Arganzuela 1860-1931. Los barrios negros*, Madrid, Catarata, 2015.

⁹³ Luis DÍAZ: *Los barrios bajos de Madrid, 1880-1931*, Madrid, Catarata, 2016.

drastic falls. Socialism was the prevailing political force in the more disadvantaged areas of Calatrava, in all the sections that were part of San Francisco and Arganzuela and in the spaces of the Southern Extra radio (Imperial and San Isidro). A paradigmatic example of the socialist strength in the district was section 24, which included the area of Cambroneras, Paseo de los Melancólicos and Paseo Imperial in the deteriorated neighborhood that gave its name to the third street. Besteiro received nearly two thirds of the support in an area inhabited by day laborers and other construction and railway workers.

Table 11. Social and professional profiles of voters and those who abstained in section 24 of La Latina (calle and callejón de Cambroneras, calle de Gil Imón, Paseo Imperial and paseo de los Melancólicos)

Social and professional category	No.	%	Votes	Abstentions
Liberal professionals and technicians	1	0.20%	1	0
Administrative and management workers	0	0%	0	0
Office workers and civil servants	12	2.42%	5	7
Sales people	22	4.44%	10	12
Service sector workers	10	2.02%	5	5
Farmers and forestry sector workers	3	0.61%	0	3
Production and transport workers	441	89.09%	161	280
No profession mentioned	6	1.21%	3	3
Total	495	100%	185	310
Day laborers and non-qualified workers	397	80.20%	143	254

Source: AVM-S, 22-254-2.

In 1923, Madrid continued to be a city with bipolar votes, with a city center that remained loyal to old political cultures and an area of Ensanche and Extrarradio that run free of monarchist control in most of its areas, except certain areas in the north and east of the city where Maurism had managed to create solid social bases during the previous decade. However, the differences amongst the different areas had gradually grown smaller, a trend that would be finally consolidated in the following election in which Madrileneans voted: the municipal election of the 12th of April 1931.

CONCLUSIONS

A detailed analysis of a general election is an exercise that allows us to observe signs of modernization in an urban area such as Madrid at the end of the Restoration period. This city portrayed at the time movements in the socialization of politics and the election behaviors that were different to those that existed at the beginning of the 20th century. The huge size increase of the capital was simultaneous to the development of a political culture with new heights, which must be analyzed separate from generalist discourses, from the doctrine evolution of parties or their influence in the political regime of that era. Examining the case of Agrupación Socialista Madrileña in this context has helped to verify some of those transformations, focusing on the machinery behind the internal structure of the party, the close contact with its social bases that led to several strategies and understanding the election results from an urban perspective.

Based on those premises, the socialist victory can be explained by the impact of several variables. We must reflect on those related to the national context, which would entail focusing on the political and social conflict atmosphere and on the questioning of the power's resources after the conflict in Morocco. However, in this paper we focus more on other factors, specifically linked to the local realm, starting with the weakness shown by Madrid's Republicanism after the break-up of Alianza de Izquierdas (Left Alliance) in 1919, followed by the lack of understanding between the monarchist parties and the maurist conservatism which prevented their coalition, and ending with the consequences of the authoritarian drift of the latter of those since the middle of 1922.

In the midst of those tensions, PSOE emerged as the party that better adapted to the new era. It had already played an important role in the past by enlarging the political culture of Madrid's inhabitants. By analyzing its election campaign, we can clearly see how the organization's tasks were fine-tuned ahead of the election day with its bases, either by correcting the lists of election rolls to guarantee true suffrage, by creating an intermediate network of political figures that could help with that task (supporters, proxies and inspectors), or by following innovative guidelines in their collective propaganda strategies. The hosting of general rallies and neighborhood rallies also helped to win the *individual conquest of new consciences*, namely in those areas of Ensanche and Extra radio where the clientele networks of old political parties was little or no configured at all.

Finally, one of the key objectives of this endeavor has been to establish a correlation between the general lines of municipal action within the PSOE and the social support obtained during the election. In general, it has been a historiographical trend to leave on the sidelines the behaviors demonstrated by the parties' representatives in the city council, based on the idea that they were purely administrative entities created by the desire of those above them. For exactly the same reasons, the municipal elections that led to the formation of those institutions has not been sufficiently studied, despite the fact that in them we could discern greater competition between political forces and their support for the design of updated plans or programs focused on social and economic changes that were taking place in the urban arena.

Those issues are fundamental when starting an election analysis that, at an urban level, cannot simply be explained by the differences between wealthy municipal districts, more prone to a dynastic vote, and mainly working class districts, more prone to a left-wing vote. Although this interpretation is valid in general terms, it must be transcended by a more accurate analysis, brought down to the level of neighborhood and electoral section. This effort allows us to establish a more accurate relationship between the political sign of the different areas of Madrid and the support the parties had there, due to the creation of committees and election office centers or meeting spaces prone to political indoctrination of its residents or to the predominance of different urban areas in the municipal programs.

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