ORDINARY ORGANIZATIONS?
THE GERMAN FOOTBALL ASSOCIATION IN THE TIME OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM

¿Organizaciones ordinarias?
La Federación Alemana de Fútbol durante el Nacional Socialismo

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Resumen: Este artículo pretende analizar el papel que jugó el fútbol –entonces uno de los deportes más populares– durante la dictadura nacionalsocialista en Alemania entre 1933 y 1945. No solo se explora la historia de la Federación Alemana de futbol (DFB) bajo la esvástica y especialmente el proceso de la Nazificación (Gleichschaltung) sino también los avances de la historiografía en los últimos 20 años. Las anteriores aproximaciones a la historiografía del deporte no han sido capaces de analizar satisfactoriamente el papel de la DFB durante el Nacional Socialismo. Por lo tanto, este artículo hará una propuesta para abordar la cuestión de la DFB desde una perspectiva de la sociología de las organizaciones.

Keywords: History of Sports; Football; National Socialism; Dictatorship; German History.
INTRODUCTION

In late 2017 the renowned German “Institut für Zeitgeschichte” (Institute of Contemporary History) in Munich advertised a postgraduate position for the history of Bayern München between 1929 and 1949. The study should not only include a comparison with the history of other football clubs in the “Third Reich” but also explore on how the club treated their German Jewish members at the time. It was the club itself that asked the Institute for this research after a debate had arisen about the clubs political involvement during the National Socialist dictatorship. The question was: did they act “worse” or “better” than other clubs between 1933 and 1945. The controversy reached not only the mainstream media in Germany but also abroad. The harsh criticism was not related to the success of Bayern München during the “Third Reich” – the team neither won the league title nor the cup during 1933 and 1945– rather, it was its ambiguous behaviour against its German Jewish members that provoked consternation. The club was led by the German Jewish president Kurt Landauer (1884-1961) until 1933. Head coach was the Austro-Hungarian Jew Richard “Little Dombi” Kohn (1888-1963), who was known in Spain for managing FC Barcelona.
twice (1926-1927 and 1933-1934). The Jewish history of the club was long forgotten until Bayern’s supporters club “Schickeria” launched a choreography in remembrance of the 125th birthday of Kurt Landauer in 2008. For their engagement against antisemitism and racism the Bayern-Ultras were awarded with the Julius-Hirsch-Price in 2014. Julius Hirsch (1892- probably 1943) was a German international who was persecuted as Jewish, murdered in Auschwitz-Birkenau and eventually literally vanished from collective football memory. The prize was introduced by the German Football Association (DFB) as a symbolic compensation for not having commemorated Hirsch and other German Jewish players and officials who were expelled from their teams or forced to leave their clubs, and who were finally forced into exile, persecuted or killed. For many years, the DFB had never critically addressed its past until they asked a professional historian to examine the role of the association during National Socialism. This first independent study, which was finally published in 2005, provoked an important discussion about football and dictatorship in general. Great efforts have been made since then. However, even though the “Third Reich” is the best explored period, not only in political history, but also in German sports historiography, there is no agreement in sight how to contextualize the findings, as proven by the recent controversy about Bayern München.

Most research on German football history was undertaken in Germany, published in German and written by researcher who were socialized in Germany. Thus, most of the

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9 In 2015 Peiffer counted 800 contributions in the previous 25 years, even though he admitted that there was still no sufficient processing of the dissemination of mass culture by Jews in German history, especially when it came to the development and significance of the self-organized German Jewish sports movement after 1933. See Lorenz PEIFFER, Sport im Nationalsozialismus. Zum aktuellen Stand der sporthistorischen Forschung. Eine kommentierte Bibliographie, 3rd amended and revised edition, Göttingen, Die Werkstatt, 2015, pp. 32.

10 In the Journal German History Schiller and Young dedicate a whole volume on German sports, but an article on German football during the Third Reich lacks. Nevertheless, they offer a comprehensive English-speaking overview about the literature on sports in general, which unfortunately is after nearly ten years out of date by
results are not accessible for non-German-readers. This article will therefore give first an overview of the state of the arts. Regarding the vast number of publications in the last years, comprehensiveness is not claimed. *Gleichschaltung* (shorthand for the process of Nazification) not only of the German Football Association but also subordination under the *Führerprinzip* (leader principle) of the *Deutsche Reichsausschuss für Leibesübungen* (umbrella organisation of sports) is then displayed. In this context, the most important questions concerning German football are still open: why association and clubs caught up so quickly with the new regime without coercion even though very few functionaries were members of any NS-Organization before 1933. The motivation for the functionaries, who brought their associations and clubs into line (*Gleichschaltung*) within a few months, is highly controversial issue and not the fact itself. Officials contributed in their area of responsibility, to the fact that the dictatorship was able to consolidate itself after Hitler's appointment as Reich Chancellor and finally persisted for twelve years. Inspired by the new studies on organisations during the “Third Reich” which were initiated by Stefan Kühls “Ordinary Organizations”\(^{11}\), this article applies an organizational sociology approach to explain how the Nazification of Sports succeeded so quickly. That this approach leads to a better understanding of organizations in the National Socialist state has been shown lately by the Sören Eden, Henry Marx and Ulrike Schulz regarding the *Reichsarbeitsministerium* (Labor Ministry of the Reich)\(^{12}\) as well as Daniel Kuppel relating to the SS (*Schutzstaffel*, literally “Protection Squadron”)\(^{13}\).

That the Nazi-dictatorship was not a monolithic block but must be embedded into broader context of German history is now generally recognized. In the past decades, research has overcome the static historical focus on the years between 1933 and 1945 and

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has emphasized continuity, especially in terms of personnel. Nevertheless, due to space restrictions this article will be limited to the 12 years of Nazi-reign. Also, it analyses only the so called Altreich (old Reich); annexed and occupied territories that were under German control after 1937 are still desiderata of research and therefore, cannot be considered. Finally, the results are summed up and concluding remarks on the advantages of the new organizational sociology approach are made in the last chapter.

STATE OF THE ARTS

The first important studies on the (political) history of sports in the “Third Reich” by German sports scientists Horst Ueberhorst, Hajo Bernett and Hans Joachim Teichler published during the 1960s to 1980s were widely ignored by political historians (so called Fachhistoriker). Due to that omission, most scholars registered the “discovery of sports by modern historiography” at the turn of the millennium. Various historical incidents culminated and led to numerous studies on sports in general and football in particular. The DFB celebrated its 100th anniversary and therefore published a chronicle that was far from


16 Horst UEBERHORST, Elite für die Diktatur, Düsseldorf, Droste, 1969.


the current state of academic research only dealt superficially with the years between 1933 and 1945\textsuperscript{22}. The influential German writer Walter Jens had already previously criticized the lack of self-reflection and the self-victimization during his speech at the 75\textsuperscript{th} birthday of DFB in 1975\textsuperscript{23}. But this time the context was different: in 2000, the International Federation of Association Football (FIFA, \textit{Fédération Internationale de Football Association}) selected Germany as host of the World Cup 2006. In the same year, for the first time a panel on the history of football was organized at the 43\textsuperscript{rd} German Conference of Historians (\textit{Deutscher Historikertag}) in Aachen. Additionally, a booming culture of memory –not only in academic circles but in the broader society too\textsuperscript{24}– prepared the ground for a controversial discussion about the Nazi past in general. The former lack of research was now pre-eminently explained by the fact that for decades either submissive sports journalists or even the functionaries themselves wrote the history of either the federation or the clubs. Due to the ignorance of sports topics by political historians, the destruction of the workers' sports movement after 1933 and the dominant anti-communist thread provided by the east-west conflict after 1945, which also spread to sporting arenas, pressure groups which could have advocated critical or opposing positions to those hagiographical publications were too weak\textsuperscript{25}.

Around the year 2000, studies about the DFB or football in the “Third Reich” in general existed, but due to the restrictive policy of the association, none of them contained archival material from the federation itself\textsuperscript{26}. Coming under pressure from the public, the DFB commissioned the aforementioned study that was finally carried out by the historian Nils Havemann. He was the first researcher who was allowed to work in the archives of the


\textsuperscript{24} For example, the intense debate on the creation of a Holocaust-Memorial in Berlin, which was finally inaugurated in 2005.

\textsuperscript{25} See for example TEICHLER, \textit{Verzögertes Erinnern}, op. cit., as well as SCHILLER and YOUNG, \textit{Introduction}, op. cit., p. 327.

After the German FA had previously ignored such inquiries\textsuperscript{27}. Reactions to Havemann’s work reminded many observers of the so called Historikerstreit (historians’ quarrel)\textsuperscript{28} from the 1980\textsuperscript{6} about the “uniqueness” of the Holocaust and the historization of National Socialism: For some, it was the first solid study that was based on primary sources as well as an independent and professional work\textsuperscript{29}, other scholars criticized the emphasis on commercialization and supposedly neutral, apolitical sports organization which obscured the situation of German Jewish victims\textsuperscript{30} or even considered it “apologetic”\textsuperscript{31}.

Controversy focused not only on the history of football, but of sports in general: the role of the chief-organizer of the Olympics 1936 in Berlin, Carl Diem as well as the history of doping in West and East Germany provoked controversial discussions\textsuperscript{32}. These debates entailed various important studies: mentioning all of them would far exceed the framework of this contribution\textsuperscript{33}. The dispute between the protagonists even continued during the aforementioned controversy about the role of Bayern München. The controversies showed the importance of studies on sports topics also for academic research\textsuperscript{34}. Thus, the subjects of research were extended. Biographies for example highlighted certain continuities between the “Third Reich” and the German Federal Republic (West Germany). Other

\textsuperscript{27} Nils HAVEMANN, Fußball, op. cit.


\textsuperscript{30} For example, Oswald came to different results. Rudolf OSWALD, Fußball-Volksgemeinschaft: Ideologie, Politik und Fanatismus im deutschen Fußball 1919-1964, Frankfurt, Campus, 2008. See also for a summary Felix MÜLLER, Der Deutsche, op. cit.


\textsuperscript{32} Frank BECKER and Ralf SCHÄFER, Einleitung, op. cit., p. 10.


\textsuperscript{34} Matthias Thoma showed in his book on the history of German Jewish club members of Eintracht Frankfurt that so called “amateur” can provide fruitful research. Matthias THOMA, "Wir waren die Juddebube". Eintracht Frankfurt in der NS-Zeit, Göttingen, Die Werkstatt, 2007.
investigations indicated that especially German Jewish athletes were not only erased from collective memory but also from the official statistics as the examples of Gottfried Fuchs and Julius Hirsch among the DFB show\textsuperscript{35}.

Lately, an anthology was published with various perspectives on the \textit{Gleichschaltung} of German football. Even though the articles come to diverse findings, the editor deems the process as unsuccessful\textsuperscript{36}. Of course the National Socialists needed the expertise of experienced functionaries and did not construct a totally new entity. In the end \textit{Gleichschaltung} was conflictual, although systematic opposition to the process or resistance in general could not be observed. The major achievement of this comprehensive book is that for the first time it offers regional and comparative studies. Berno Bahro shows that the \textit{Turner} (gymnasts) and \textit{Ruderer} (rowers) in Berlin and Brandenburg seemed to be equally eager to come to an arrangement with the regime while football clubs were more indifferent, though the author emphasized that his results are still preliminary\textsuperscript{37}. A revealing perspective is provided by Alan McDougal, who compares the \textit{Gleichschaltungen} of football by the either single political party in the “Third Reich” and in the German Democratic Republic (GDR)\textsuperscript{38} and comes to the conclusion, that “differences […] were more striking than the similarities”. He demonstrates that the process of submission under the Nazi-rule was more compliant and faster than under socialist-reign. Remarkably, more sports functionaries became members of \textit{NSDAP} (National Socialist German Workers Party) than of \textit{SED}.


\textsuperscript{38} Even though in the German socialist state existed several parties (so called Bloc Parties) which were also presented in the \textit{Volkskammer} (People’s Chamber), the Socialist Unity Party (SED) was the only ruling party in the Eastern German state until 1990.
(Socialist Unity Party of Germany) despite the relatively limited duration of the “Third Reich” in comparison with the GDR (12 to 40 years)\textsuperscript{39}.

Another interesting as well as unsettling outcome concerns research on football in the German concentration camps. In nearly all of them, prisoners were given the permission to play football since the summer of 1942, depending on privileges, their health condition and —of course— their football skills\textsuperscript{40}.

Research on sports history in general and football in particular is currently booming\textsuperscript{41}, even though an overall coverage is lacking for Germany\textsuperscript{42} and there are still demands for further research. For example, it was not until 2017 that Michael Hau’s study on Sport and Work was published, in which he also dedicated a chapter on *Reichsberufswettkämpfe* (Reich Vocational Competitions), one of the biggest mass events of the “Third Reich”\textsuperscript{43}. There is also a lack of comprehensive studies about the introduction of the “*Arierparagraphen*” (“Aryan paragraph”) in German sport clubs\textsuperscript{44} or interpretation of sport for Alltags- und Sozialgeschichte (social and everyday life history) of the German Jewish population.\textsuperscript{45} It can be expected that this literature boom, the publicly debated controversies and the strong public interest in football in Germany in general will lead to more comparative


\textsuperscript{42} See Frank Becker, Ralf Schäfer, “Einleitung”, op. cit., pp. 19-22. The authors indicate that in Austria such a study already exists since ten years: Matthias Marschik, *Sportdiktatur: Bewegungskulturen im nationalsozialistischen Österreich*, Wien, Turia + Kant, 2008.


\textsuperscript{44} Berno Bahro, *Die Einführung*, op. cit., pp. 115-116.

studies on other countries as well as to further and more solid research of Football and Dictatorships.

THE GERMAN FOOTBALL ASSOCIATION DURING THE “THIRD REICH”

Many forget that before 1933 football in Germany was not only organized throughout the “bourgeois” DFB; thousands of athletes were organized in workers (ATSB)\(^{46}\) and denominational bodies (the catholic Deutsche Jugend Kraft and the protestant Eichenlaub) as well as in Jewish (VINTUS, Makkabi or Schild)\(^{47}\) sponsored organizations. Thus, since the Kaiserreich (Empire) the sport was fragmented alongside political and religious boundaries\(^{48}\). The institution of bourgeois sports later functioned as a platform for newly erected, state driven and “unified” Nazi organisations. Leading figures of these bourgeois institutions from the times before the Machtübernahme (Nazi take-over of power) continued to play a crucial role in those entities\(^{49}\). The Reichssportführer (sports leader of the Reich) Hans von Tschammer und Osten, who was not distinguished in German sports but rather a high ranked SA-Führer\(^{50}\) and a capable organizer, saw the DFB as “typical liberal object”\(^ {51}\). Despite that, he granted apparent autonomy to feign a certain continuity. In 1935 Tschammer initiated the first annually hold German knockout football cup competition, today known as DFB-Pokal whereas in other countries like England in 1871 or Spain in 1903 a comparable competition was introduced long before.


\(^{48}\) Michael BRENNER and Gideon REUVENI, Emancipation, op. cit., p. 5.

\(^{49}\) Frank BECKER and Ralf SCHÄFER, op. cit., Einleitung, p. 12.

\(^{50}\) SA stands for Sturm Abteilung and is usually translated as Storm Troopers. Another remarkable overlapping regarding Spanish sports history having in mind that with José Moscardó Ituarte an amateur became Delegado nacional de Deportes during the first years of Francoism.

Of course, sport was regarded as a means to promote *Wehrertüchtigung* (military fitness) in preparation for later wars. It was also supposed to underscore military values and played a crucial role in what was known as *Ausleseverhältnisse* (selective conditions). It is remarkable that the sports clubs themselves introduced military sports departments shortly after Hitler's appointment as Chancellor. However, whether this happened in conviction, anticipatory obedience or was a strategy to protect oneself from the influence of the *Hitlerjugend* (*HJ*, Hitler Youth) is sometimes controversial and must be examined individually at each club. In his study of the southern German Club *VfB Stuttgart* under National Socialism, Gregor Hofmann points out that it was not clear whether the sports clubs would be able to maintain their youth work after 1933 and stand alongside the Hitler Youth. In the end, they were able to continue their work with young players, "but an always fragile state between cooperation and competition characterized the relationship between the club youth and the Hitler Youth". For most scholars – comparable to the Spanish *Falange* – German fascist party *NSDAP* was apparently lacking a clear plan for sports and experienced personnel.

As well as in other political and social spheres the main impact was therefore the destruction of the existing structures belonging to those who were regarded absolute enemies of the eclectic Nazi ideology: first the Marxist movements sport in 1933, then, in 1936, the denominational sponsored sports association and finally, in the context of the antisemitic terror of November 1938, the Jewish sports organization. The fact that the Jewish associations *VINTUS* (*Verband jüdisch-neutraler Turn- und Sportvereine*), *Maccabi* and *Schild* were not dissolved directly after 1933 but even gradually gained members appears surprising at first glance. The numbers went up to an estimated 50,000 Athletes in 300 Clubs making them the largest Jewish organization in Germany. Of course this was the result of the expulsion of German Jewish players and functionaries by many other Clubs, at that point without any political pressure. For example, on April 9, 1933, fourteen

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54 For Hofmann there was “not a planned procedure” to be identified but rather “a set of ad hoc decisions”. *Ibidem*, p. 67. Even though this assumption is being questioned by Frank BECKER and Ralf SCHÄFER, *Einleitung*, op. cit., p. 22.
55 See the latest numbers compiled in Lorenz PEIFFER and Arthur HEINRICH, *Juden im Sport*, op. cit., p. 9.
clubs from South Germany announced in the so called “Stuttgarter Erklärung” (Resolution of Stuttgart) that they were willing to add an “Aryan paragraph” to their club rules. The fact that this was merely a declaration of intent shows the different ways in which the clubs implemented it.\footnote{Nils Havemann, \textit{Fußball, op. cit}, p. 158.}

The occasion for the resolution was a meeting of the clubs who had qualified for the Southern German football championship whereas the direct context were the first boycotts against German Jewish businesses a few days before and the entry into force of the \textit{Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums} (Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service), of April 7, 1933. The “First Implementing Ordinance” of April 11, 1933 determined who was “not of Aryan descent”.\footnote{Axel Töllner, “Arierparagrafen”, Wolfgang Benz (ed.), \textit{Handwörterbuch des Antisemitismus. Judenfeindschaft in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Band 3. Begriffe, Theorien, Ideologien}, Berlin/New York, De Gruyter, 2010, pp. 28-30, here p. 28. Everywhere in Germany clubs and institutions sought to expel their German Jewish or “non-Ayran” members. Who was defined as a Jew and who was not, remained totally unclear before the implementation of the Decree. The “First Implementing Ordinance” should solve this problem. The regime tried to contain this antisemitic grassroots activism and put it on a legal footing with the new legislation. That the sports clubs had initially overstepped their responsibilities with their “Aryan paragraphs” was shown by the fact that, in opposition to other associations like the gymnasts, the football authorities did not issue a general instruction to the clubs to expel Jewish members.

Quite the opposite in fact: the regime did not want to risk any boycotts of the Olympics which were to take place in Berlin in 1936 and tried to conceal its real intentions. Any official, standardized action had to wait until the Games were over. The \textit{DFB} did not state concrete rules, therefore each association elaborated its own paragraph, like the VfB Stuttgart, which orients itself at the law for the Civil Service Restoration Act.\footnote{Gregor Hofmann, \textit{Der VfB Stuttgart, op. cit.}, pp. 58-59.} The former President of the \textit{DFB} and now Leader of \textit{Fachamt Fußball} Linnemann drafted a model constitution in which “the question of religion […] is to be developed in such a way that the ancestry can be examined racially”, but it did not become mandatory.\footnote{Arthur Heinrich, \textit{Der Deutsche, op. cit.}, p. 144.}
few exceptional cases even managed to stay members of those clubs even entangled in the official structures, in some cases as late as 1940\textsuperscript{60} when the “Aryan Paragraph” was introduced by the \textit{NSRL} \textsuperscript{61}. But most Associations and Clubs expelled their Jewish members or forced them to leave on “their free will” without coercion. This can be interpreted as \textit{Selbstermächtigung} (Self-empowerment), a concept elaborated by Michael Wildt that explains how the Nazi-dictatorship functioned through its participative means from bottom up moored on the population’s growing responsiveness to the regime\textsuperscript{62}. This historical social science approach understands reign as social practice and thus overcomes the long implicit differentiation between Nazis and Germans. It sees the German society as \textit{Volksgemeinschaft} (“people’s community”, understood here as an ethnonationalist body politic) with its own ethnicities and norms\textsuperscript{63}. For sports it is important to understand, that professionalism –as it was discussed before 1933– contradicted the idea of the imagined “people’s community”. In order to understand the special nature of modern German anti-Semitism, one must recognize that it “involves a biologization of capitalism […] as International Jewry”\textsuperscript{64}. Havemann points out that it was precisely the associations in Southern and Southwestern Germany which excluded their Jewish fellow citizens, in which German Jews held a responsible position and advocated the introduction of profit. For Havemann, this indicated that there had also been internal power struggles regarding the topic of professionalism\textsuperscript{65} but underestimates anti-Semitically connotation that the movement against professional football in German always had\textsuperscript{66}. What should have been a key question in dispute in the \textit{DFB}, is left aside in his wide-ranging study. The project of a

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{HAVEMANN} Nils HAVEMANN, Fußball, op. cit., p. 159, endnote 358.
\bibitem{SCHUBERT} Florian SCHUBERT, \textit{Antisemitismus im Fußball. Tradition und Tabubruch}, Göttingen, Wallstein Verlag, 2019, p. 11.
\end{thebibliography}
Reichsliga, which is always associated with the query of professional players. This project of a single-track top league, as it had existed already in other European countries as Spain since 1929, was decided by the DFB-Bundestag (National Conference) in autumn 1932 under pressure from the press and “would certainly have developed into a bankrupt company in the economic context of the time”\(^{67}\), if it had been introduced. The Nazi seizure to power put an end to that idea.

As the Olympic Games in 1936 played a key role for the Nazi-government, the illusion of normality was to be maintained towards the international community\(^{68}\). Successful performances by German athletes should demonstrate the alleged superiority of the “Aryan race”, and the perfect organization of a powerful but peaceful state. The new ruling power wanted to show off the loyalty of German citizens and the recovery of the economy, while opposition was systematically oppressed and secretly monitored\(^{69}\). To reach this ambitious target, they had to rely on the capacities of experienced sports functionaries and coaches if they did not want to endanger the smooth functioning of the organization of the games and the preparation of the athletes. The German national football was a gold medal candidate after winning third place at the 1934 World Cup in Italy. So, the DFB, which operated under the name of Fachamt Fußball (Department of Football) since April 1936, had to fulfil these high expectations. Without a certain continuity, success would have been much more difficult. Sports should appear independent from politics. Otherwise FIFA, which always claimed to be apolitical, might have questioned the autonomy of German football and the Department would have come under threat of being suspended from FIFA\(^{70}\). Ultimately, the exploitation of the Olympics by the German hosts can be regarded as successful, but the

\(^{67}\) Christiane EISENBERG, *Die Entdeckung*, op. cit., p. 571. Context refers to the global economic crisis, which plunged many associations and clubs into a severe financial crisis. Eisenberg points out that apart from the English leagues, all European leagues have not been profitable, even before the crisis.


\(^{69}\) Just 20 kilometres outside from Berlin the first preparation for the Concentration Camp Sachsenhausen were undertaken as Hitler held the inauguration speech. These first camps were mainly for political prisoners as well as so called “asocial” and “works-shy” persons. See Nikolaus WACHSMANN, *KL. Die Geschichte der nationalsozialistischen Konzentrationslager*, Bonn, BpB, 2016, p. 118.

\(^{70}\) For the fact that FIFA has by no means always lived up to this claim, see the example from Spanish Civil War: Julian RIECK, “Football as an alternative diplomacy during the Civil War”, Valero GÓMEZ and García CARRIÓN, *Desde la capital de la República. Nuevas perspectivas y estudios sobre la Guerra Civil española*, Valencia, PUV, 2018, pp. 231-264.
football tournament was a total disaster. The team lost against the underdog Norway 0-2 in the quarterfinals, exactly when the Nazi Dictator Adolf Hitler officially attended one of his few football games\textsuperscript{71}.

The once-privately organized \textit{Deutsche Reichsausschuss für Leibesübungen} (umbrella organisation of nearly 50 sports disciplines) was dissolved in 1934 and sport – after a transitional period– was \textit{de facto} nationalized by the \textit{Nationalsozialistischer Reichsbund für Leibesübungen} (NSRL, National Socialist Reich League for Physical Exercise) in 1938\textsuperscript{72}. For the Department of Football, full incorporation into the hierarchy of state and party effectively signified its liquidation in 1940. By a decree issued by Hitler, the NSRL became an “organization supervised by the NSDAP”, thereupon, its capital was transferred to Reich League\textsuperscript{73}. From this time on, the \textit{Kreisführer des NSRL} (district leaders of the Reich League) determined the club leaders in agreement with the responsible NSDAP county leaders\textsuperscript{74}. Given the fact that the liquidation of sports associations was carried out by their own functionaries against their own Articles of Incorporation, researchers speak of “\textit{Selbstgleichschaltung}” (Self-Nazification)\textsuperscript{75} or anticipatory obedience. According to Bahro, however, it is often not possible to ascertain from the available sources what exactly the motivation for the board changes of every club or federation were\textsuperscript{76}.

Even before the Olympics, Hitler had already announced that it should be the last games Germany would participate in. Future sport events should take place under German rule in the proposed \textit{Deutsches Stadion} (German stadium) for 450,000 spectators in Nürnberg, which in the end was never built\textsuperscript{77}. Therefore, there would be no need for international sports bodies, such as FIFA or International Olympic Committee (IOC). After successfully having benefitted from knowhow and experience of the “bourgeois” functionaries, pressure was increased by the more radical forces of the National Socialist

\textsuperscript{71} Rudolf OSWALD, \textit{Fußball-Volksgemeinschaft}, op. cit., p. 138.
\textsuperscript{72} Markwart HERZOG, \textit{Einleitung}, op. cit., p. 18.
\textsuperscript{73} \textit{Reichsgesetzblatt} (Reichs Law Gazette) quoted by Gregor HOFMANN, \textit{Der VfB Stuttgart}, op. cit., p. 60 and Nils HAVEMANN, \textit{Fußball}, op. cit., p. 211.
\textsuperscript{74} Gregor HOFMANN, \textit{Der VfB Stuttgart}, op. cit., p. 60.
\textsuperscript{75} Rudolf OSWALD, \textit{Fußball-Volksgemeinschaft}, op. cit., p. 47.
\textsuperscript{76} Berno BAHRO, \textit{Die Einführung}, op. cit., p. 118.
movement to extend their dreamed revolution to sports\textsuperscript{78}. It was characterized by the Kompetenzgerangel (turf war) between the Nazi-organizations Deutsche Arbeitsfront (German Labour Front), Sturm Abteilung (Storm Troopers) and Schutzstaffel (Protection Squadron) who all claimed sports to be their business\textsuperscript{79}. These internally competing Nazi organizations are examples of the polycratic dynamics advocated by structuralists historians as Martin Broszat and Hans Mommsen. According to them, it was this competition and tension that shaped most decisions and led the “cumulative radicalization” (Mommsen) of the Nazi state, rather than the order of the alleged leading figure Hitler\textsuperscript{80}.

These conflicts can also be identified by persons. Josef Klein for example was not only Member of NSDAP since 1930, Preußisches Abgeordnetenhaus (Prussian House of Representatives) and Reichstags (Diet of the Realm) since July 1932, but he had also expressed his "anti-democratic, nationalistic and racist views" in numerous texts before 1933. In May 1933 he became Chairman of the Westdeutscher Fußballverband (Western German Football Association). As early as 1933 Klein refused to give up the independence of the Westdeutscher Landesverband and thus came into conflict with the regime and later even turned his back on it\textsuperscript{81}. Recent research on members of NSDAP shows that such conflicts were no exceptions. According to his latest study on the members of NSDAP, Jonas Meißner concludes that around 60 percent of the members who had joined the NSDAP between 1925 and 1929 subsequently left the party until the end of Second World War\textsuperscript{82}. This can also be applied to the majority of members of DFB: “Few of them belonged

\textsuperscript{78} Nils HAVEMANN, Fußball, op. cit., p. 207.


\textsuperscript{80} See Ian KERSHAW, The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation, 4\textsuperscript{th} edition, London, Bloomsbury Academic, 2015, pp. 79-88.

\textsuperscript{81} Nils HAVEMANN, Fußball, op. cit., pp. 119-126 and 315, the quote is from p. 122.

to the NSDAP before 1933; few of them stayed away from it after 1933\textsuperscript{83}. Leader of Fachamt Fußball Felix Linnemann did not enter any Nazi-Organization before 1937. As high-ranking police detective, he became member of the SS in 1940 and was later responsible for the deportation of Sinti and Roma resident in the Hannover region to the concentration camps\textsuperscript{84}.

Here two outcomes become apparent. First: one did not have to be a member of a Nazi organization to be responsible in any way. Second: convinced National Socialists could come into conflict with the regime over time and not necessarily play an active role in the crimes. So, each case must be considered individually.

**GERMAN FOOTBALL CLUBS AND THE DFB (GERMAN FA) – ORDINARY ORGANIZATIONS?\textsuperscript{85}**

The reasons for the rapid \textit{Selbstgleichschaltung} of the DFB and the associations under National Socialism are the subject of frequent debate and controversy. Nils Havemann, for example, tries to explain the behaviour of the functionaries with a variety of factors: “The tendency – visible at all times, even in free societies – to avoid unpleasant truths and to continue obvious mistakes was encouraged by traditions, personal fears and ambitions, as well as social conventions and expectations”\textsuperscript{86}. This mere enumeration of almost apologetic explanations for action is, according to the sociologist Stefan either “justified, weighted, nor – and this weighs more heavily- put in relation to each other.” How anti-Semitism, anti-democratic thinking, career orientation, belief in authority, corps mentality and group pressure are related is not explained\textsuperscript{87}. As Kühl points out, it is not even

\textsuperscript{83} Nils HAVEMANN, \textit{Fußball, op. cit.}, p. 103. Heinrich comes to the same result, see Arthur HEINRICH, \textit{Der Deutsche, op. cit.}, p. 158.


\textsuperscript{85} The DFB was in fact a meta-organization because beside its employees it consisted of several member organizations, namely the regional associations. Meta-organizations are usually weak. However, the DFB succeeded in acquiring its own funds and thus was less dependent on its member organizations. Even though the regional associations are historically very powerful, the observations made by Kühl are also valid for such a meta-organization, and justify the view from a sociological perspective. See Göran AHRNE and Nils BRUNSSON, \textit{Meta-Organizations}, Cheltenham, Northampton, Edward Elgar, 2008, pp. 3 and 138.

\textsuperscript{86} Nils HAVEMANN, \textit{Fussball, op. cit.}, p. 341.

\textsuperscript{87} See for the quote and the reference Stefan KÜHL, \textit{Organisationen, op. cit.} 14.
possible to determine the motivation behind people’s behaviour if “the brain was checked with a scanner during the action”\textsuperscript{88}. Applying an organizational sociology approach from systems theory, he argues that organizations are decisive in bringing individuals with a variety of different motives together “to do things they would not have done outside the organization”\textsuperscript{89}. Havemann concludes that the representatives of the DFB were "functionaries in the truest sense of the word: They always made sure that it worked and how everything worked in their area of responsibility, but only rarely why and with what consequences"\textsuperscript{90}. Adopting the sociological approach, it is less important what the individual's motives are, since for the organisation it is only crucial that the expected actions are also carried out by its members\textsuperscript{91}.

Kühl's investigation follows on from research by Christopher R. Browning\textsuperscript{92} and Daniel J. Goldhagen\textsuperscript{93} on Police Battalion 101 from Hamburg, which committed mass crimes and killed several thousand people during the Second World War. Although these actions are by no means comparable to the role of the DFB in the “Third Reich”, Kühl's approach can contribute to the understanding of the how and why the DFB and various other football clubs, as organizations, made considerable contributions to stabilizing National Socialist rule.

As with most of the members of the examined Police battalion 101, football players and functionaries before 1933 were not convinced National Socialists and/or members of Nazi organizations\textsuperscript{94}. Or as Sören Eden, Henry Marx and Ulrike Schulz put it in their investigation on the German Labor Ministry: “NSDAP membership does not prove that members with a party membership act differently than those without one”\textsuperscript{95}. Kühl instead explores five means of performance motivation for organizations, which makes their

\textsuperscript{88} Stefan Kühl, Organisationen, op. cit., 75.
\textsuperscript{89} Stefan Kühl, Organisationen, op. cit., 330.
\textsuperscript{90} Nils Havemann, Fussball, op. cit., 340.
\textsuperscript{91} Stefan Kühl, Organisationen, op. cit., p. 246.
\textsuperscript{94} See for football the previous chapter and for the police battalion Stefan Kühl, Organisationen, op. cit., p. 24.
\textsuperscript{95} Sören Eden, Henry Marx and Schulz, Verwaltungen, op. cit., p. 500.
members subordinate to the organizational goals: Identification with the broader aims; coercion; collegiality or comradeship of the members; the monetary incentives it provided; and finally, the attractiveness of the activities.\textsuperscript{96}

In contrast to the police battalion, the \textit{DFB} was not formally a coercive organisation. It was up to the individual to decide whether he became a member, an employee of the \textit{DFB}, or accepted an invitation to play for the national team. A central feature of voluntary organisations is, according to Kühl, the ability to determine membership. For the \textit{DFB}, this means that it can decide who enters and exits the association:

“\textit{And – more momentously – it can decide who should no longer belong to it because it [the member] no longer follows the rules of the organisation. The organisation thus creates limits within which the members (and only the members) must submit to the rules of the organisation, and there is a permanent threat in the room that the member has to leave the organisation if it does not follow its rules.}\textsuperscript{97}

Types of organizations such as the military and the police tend to develop collegiality into comradeship and, accordingly, establish far-reaching expectations in the form of informal pressure and peer pressure on staff among themselves.\textsuperscript{98} A similar situation can be observed in football, where the language is very militaristic, especially in Germany, and this is not the only reason why comradeship was often spoken of. \textit{Kameradschaft} (Comradeship) was always highlighted\textsuperscript{99} and plays a crucial role in the narrative that a football team should consist of contain of eleven friends or comrades. However, it is unlikely that this was the case for functionaries. According to Havemann, the officials were predominantly characterised by “a great deal of ambition and a pronounced sense of power”.\textsuperscript{100}

Money played a subordinate role, because only a few full-time officials were employed by the \textit{DFB}. The payments for players were limited to the reimbursement of

\textsuperscript{96} Stefan KÜHL, \textit{Organisationen}, op. cit., p. 84.
\textsuperscript{97} Stefan KÜHL, \textit{Einführung}, op. cit., p. 18.
\textsuperscript{98} Stefan KÜHL, \textit{Einführung}, op. cit., pp. 43-45.
\textsuperscript{99} According to Havemann President Linnemann called the DFB even a “community of comradeship”. See Nils HAVEMANN, \textit{Fussball}, op. cit., p. 118. Herberger addressed his letters to the players with: Dear comrade (Sehr geehrter Kamerad) or Dear Sportscomrade (Sehr geehrter Sportskamerad).
\textsuperscript{100} Nils HAVEMANN, \textit{Fussball}, op. cit., p. 23.
expenses and tickets. But above all, the players would hardly have ended their career in the national team. Later, during the war, another motivation was even more important: Every game, every training camp meant a few weeks’ leave from the front, and a temporary reprieve from the war.

A closer look is necessary to make statements about the identification with the goal of the DFB: Organisations are defined as “social entities” which “have a permanent goal and a formal structure to direct the activities of their members towards the pursued goal”\(^{101}\). Often the goals are not clearly formulated in organisations. This is also reflected in research: Havemann argues that the DFB was profit-oriented, while others such as Heinrich and Oswald have worked out ideological and political objectives\(^{102}\). In fact, the goal was constantly changing. In the early years of the association the goal was to assume responsibility for its rules and regulations as well as the promotion of football in general. Then it became managing the German championship and organizing a national team. For the years between 1933 and 1945, it could be asked whether the goal of the DFB was to successfully play football or make money, to subordinate itself to the political necessities of the regime, or even to prepare for war? Havemann, who advocates the thesis that the DFB has consistently pursued economic goals, cannot explain this change with his personal approach when it comes to the above-mentioned liquidation of the Association in mid-1936 and its transformation into Fachamt Fußball. “[T]he Fachamt no longer seemed to be as interested in the economic returns from the matches as the DFB had previously been. […] It therefore gave the impression as though the Nazis, in their sublime sense of mission, no longer wanted to deal with earthly profit-loss accounts and […] tried to concentrate mainly on their ‘idealistic’ objectives in sport”\(^{103}\). And after the Annexation of Austria (the so-called Anschluss), when it was stipulated that the newly formed German national team should be made up of six German and five Austrian players, or vice versa\(^{104}\), it was openly political and thus even completely against the assumed goal of the organization. Organizational research calls such phenomena changes of goals: “Organizations [have] […] the possibility


\(^{102}\) See for the different positions Nils HAVEMANN, Fußball, op. cit, p. 331, and the contributions already in the title marked with the attributes politically or ideologically provided by Rudolf OSWALD, Fußball-Volksgemeinschaft, op. cit. and Arthur HEINRICH, Der Deutsche, op. cit.

\(^{103}\) Nils HAVEMANN, Fußball, op. cit, p. 226.

\(^{104}\) Nils HAVEMANN, Fußball, op. cit, pp. 232-233.
to expand their horizons almost arbitrarily\textsuperscript{105}. Thus, it may even come to competing goals in an organization. For the \textit{DFB}, that happened when the \textit{Anschluss} took place. For the clubs, this is true when they started to expel their Jewish members in early 1933. German Jewish functionary traditionally played an important role in the administrations of clubs, which thus lost important knowhow. A prime example is Bayern München, which won the national competition in 1932, but never played an important role during the time of the “Third Reich”. As mentioned before, the Clubs actions surpassed the regime goals by far. Given the fact that the new regime did not want risk a boycott, therefore they let participate the German Jews in sports again. They needed to maintain the façade because they would risk the major goal for the regime\textsuperscript{106}.

Players, functionaries and members were strongly bound to the federation through the identification with the goal, as well as the attractiveness of the actions. Kühl: “A number of organisations bind their members almost exclusively by offering attractive activities. You become a member of a football club because you like to run after a ball”\textsuperscript{107}. In football clubs the combination of motivation is to be highlighted. Sports organizations originally motivated their members by the attractiveness of the activity. But at an early stage of the \textit{DFB} the idea of being among the best players in the country or representing the country abroad became a motivation beyond that. And for the functionaries – in most of the cases former players – the opportunity arose to pursue a career in the association and thereby secure an income and/or social recognition. With reference to the influential systems theoretician Niklas Luhmann, Kühl summarises: “Whatever has induced individual members to join a company, an association or a party, […] the organisation can expect members to abide by the rules as long as they want to remain members of the organisation. Thus, the organisation can count on a ‘homogenised membership motivation’ despite all contradictions and only in exceptional situations has to deal with the question why the members are actually members of the organisation”\textsuperscript{108}. That is also true for the \textit{DFB} in the “Third Reich”. Joseph Klein, the above-mentioned \textit{NSDAP}-member before 1933 and functionary of the West German Association, from a certain moment on did not go along with the organization’s rules, so he

\textsuperscript{105} Stefan KÜHL, \textit{Einführung}, op. cit., pp. 55 and 61.
\textsuperscript{107} Stefan KÜHL, \textit{Einführung}, op. cit., p. 42.
left the *DFB*. Others like Linnemann or Sepp Herberger, the manager of the national team, who were not politically connected to any Nazi organization before 1933, remained members of the *DFB* until the end of the war. From an organizational sociological approach, it is not the personal convictions that are important, but the context in which this happens and what is expected of the member\textsuperscript{109}.

The member does not need to inculcate a full embrace of the goals. Between full acceptance and complete rejection of the mandated actions lies “a zone of indifference”, which encompasses a sphere of activities that may be unpleasant for an organizational member, but which he or she will nevertheless fulfil, albeit indifferently\textsuperscript{110}. In the Weimar Republic, no player was required to make a political statement. However, in the “Third Reich” it became quite normal by the spring of 1933 to give the Hitler salute and sing the “Horst Wessels Song” before a game\textsuperscript{111}. As Kühl points out, this is not unusual behaviour in an organization:

“They declare their willingness to adapt to changes in the organization as a condition of membership. In this way, organizations can modify their purposes without the prior consent of their members. [...] Experience has shown that members within the indifference zone endure a high degree of change, disappointment and stress before deciding to leave the organisation. This freedom of disposition created by the indifference zone enables organisations to secure their existence in a changing environment through permanent adaptation”\textsuperscript{112}.

When the manager of the national team Sepp Herberger received the order to play with either six German and five Austrian players, or the other way around, he tried to protest to Linnemann. But when this had no chance of success, he did not resign as coach and accepted the order, although he was aware that this political decision was contrary to his sporting goals\textsuperscript{113}. In the end, the “Großdeutsche” team actually lost in the first round against Switzerland 2:4.

\textsuperscript{109} Sören EDEN, Henry MARX and SCHULZ, *Verwaltungen*, op. cit., p. 515-516.
\textsuperscript{111} Nils HAVEMANN, *Fussball*, op. cit., p. 142.
\textsuperscript{112} Stefan KÜHL, *Einführung*, op. cit., pp. 36-37.
The result is that the members of the *DFB* never questioned the political goals of the *NSDAP* and the regime. From a personalized approach it is surprising that “ordinary men”, ordinary sports functionaries, whose behaviour before 1933 did not indicate a deep association with Nacional Socialist ideals, fulfilled their role in the “Third Reich”. From an organizational sociological approach, the findings of this investigation lie in the nature of any organization.\(^{114}\)

The last international match during the Nazi’s time in power took place in November 1942 against Slovakia and the last final of the German championship organized by the *Fachamt* was played in a sold-out Olympic Stadium in Berlin in June 1944, just a few days after the Allies successfully landed in Normandy. The last recorded game is dated 29th April 1945 between Hamburger SV and Altona 93, just 9 days before the end of Second World War in Europe.\(^ {115}\)

The members of the *DFB*, or later *Fachamt Fussball*, fulfilled their job in the organisation and kept it running until the very end – no matter what a functionary did. Whether Sepp Herberger drew up training plans, Felix Linnemann, as one of three liquidators, dissolved the DFB in violation of its statutes, or Fritz Walter made the Hitler salute before an international match, they all played their part in consolidating National Socialist rule for 12 years. If they had refused, none of them would have ended up in the concentration camp or would have been shot. But they acted the way the organization they were members of demanded.

**SUMMARY**

Sport was an effective means to commit athletes, functionaries and audiences to the regime, and was maybe even more effective than the eclectic Nazi ideology. More than that: “The regime promoted sport to encourage people’s performance-orientation in all areas of community life.”\(^ {116}\) Thus, neither the importance of sports in general nor football as one of the most attractive sports in Germany at that time should be underestimated as it was for

\(^{114}\) Stefan KÜHL, *Organisationen*, op. cit., p. 326.


decades. Nor should the argumentation obscure the consequences and the responsibility of conformist activities and behaviour during the “Third Reich”. Via a wide range of behaviour, functionaries, athletes, coaches and spectators played their part during the Selbstgleischantung of football and the expulsion of Gemeinschaftsfremde (those deemed to be at odds with the “racist people’s community”). The example of football during National Socialism shows how crucial it is to dismiss the idea of ‘neutral’ sport being exploited by politics. Sports in general – and football in particular – have been firm components of the Nazi-dictatorship and thereby “subsystems of German society”.

Even if the sociological approach offered here could only be presented curiously: Despite – or, rather, because of – the discussion of research into German sports histography being so controversial, studies on sport history from other countries may benefit from the conclusions of organizational sociology. It is apparent that the main controversy surrounds the purported motivation of the functionaries and players, and not on the fact that their behaviour stabilized the Nazi-Regime for 12 years. Therefore it is to emphasize that the actions of those responsible were guided by the logic of the organization, in this case the German FA. The personal motivation of the person acting is of less importance, because we can never fathom and prove them with absolute certainty. Applying this method also helps to come to a better understanding of sports organizations in dictatorships in general.

The “German case” also indicates that there is a need not only for cooperation between social, political and sport historians, but also of independent studies, such as the one about Bayern München mentioned at the beginning of this paper. Regarding the role of football clubs during the Spanish Civil War and the Franco-Dictatorship, independent research is crucial for Spanish histography, too. If based on a broad-source base, a comparative volume can lead to interesting results, as a currently published anthology on football clubs during dictatorships in Argentina and in Chile shows.

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118 See Frank BECKER and Ralf SCHAEPER, Einleitung, op. cit., p. 11.

119 Raanan REIN, Mariano GRUSCHETSKY, Rodrigo DASKAL (eds.), Clubes de fútbol en tiempos de dictadura, San Martín, Unsam Edita, 2018.
In Germany it took almost 60 years for football’s significance during the National Socialist era to be critically discussed in public. And still, there is much more research to be done. One of the consequences of these decades of silence became apparent in preparation for the 2018 FIFA World Cup in Russia. In the course of the controversy about Mesut Özil,\(^{120}\) it became apparent that many in the Federal Republic of Germany still assumed that there is both a homogeneous and hermetic national team and a German nation. That the word International in the German language when referring to football fixtures is referred to as national since the time of “Third Reich” is only one indicator for that thesis. The fact that the existence of German Jewish functionaries such as Gustav Landauer, players such as Julius Hirsch and Gottfried Fuchs, who still holds the record for the most goals scored by a German in a single international match,\(^{121}\) were denied until the mid-2000s shows what consequences a social silence has for the present. There are plenty of examples from each generation of players whose origins tell the story of migration and diversity within the German national team. There were the already mentioned Jewish players Fuchs and Hirsch. In 1913, Camillo Ugi, the son of an Italian migrant, held the record for most international appearances with a total of 15. Frequently represented were the descendants of migrants from Poland, whose ancestors' origins are reflected in the surnames of many international players, especially from the Ruhr area. They include Stanislaus Kobierski, who played during the 1930s and 1940s, Hans Tilkowski from the 1950s and 1960s, the East German international Waldemar Ksienzyk and last but not least the 2014 world champions Miroslav Klose and Lukas Podolski. Rainer Bonhof, the World Cup-winner from 1974, had a Dutch mother, and Jimmy Hartwig, a US-American father. Felix Magath, European champion of 1980, is the son of a Puerto Rican soldier in the United States Army deployed to West-Germany. His teammate from 1980, Mirosav Votava, was born in Prague. During the German football crisis of the 1990s, Paulo Rink, a forward of Brazilian origin with a German great-grandfather, was naturalized and made his debut for the national team in 1999, while Mustafa Doğan became the first Turkish-born, German-

raised footballer to play for Germany. Not only will this history of diversity, but also the
criminal attempts during the time of the “Third Reich” to create a homogeneous and racist
society through “Aryan paragraphs”, to which a Julius Hirsch fell victim, remain in the
shadows if history is not reappraised.

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