Metaethics and deliberation in bioethics
A constructivist view
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.20318/universitas.2025.9577Keywords:
constructivism, bioethics, argumentations, moral judgement, pluralismAbstract
In this paper, I argue that constructivism in metaethics is an adequate basis for the objectivity of moral judgments in bioethics. Constructivism in metaethics argues that moral judgments derived from normative deliberations are objective due to the construction process through which they are framed. If the construction process follows the guidelines appropriately, the resulting moral judgment will be correct. In bioethical deliberation, such as that carried out by hospital bioethics committees, an exchange of plural reasons arises to solve a moral problem. The upshot of the argumentative exchange is correct if the process in which the deliberation took place was adequate.
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