Realismo y pragmatismo en las concepciones intrapersonal e interpersonal de la responsabilidad. Comentario a Adscripción y reacción de Sebastián Figueroa
Abstract
This text is a balance of the chapter IV of Sebastián Figueroa Rubio's book Adscripción y reacción. First, it explains why it is necessary to defend an interpersonal conception of responsibility in this chapter, and then it criticizes the way Figueroa makes this defense in two ways. On the one hand, the identification of an intrapersonal conception with a metaphysical vision of the correctness of judgments about the attribution of responsibility is questioned. On other hand, it challenges the notion that any judgment about the attribution of responsibility is made from a perspective.
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References
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