Preferences, Personality, and Rational Choice in Aristotle and Theophrastus
Abstract
Aristotle outlines a clear theory of human rational choice in his discussions of prohairesis, which is tantalizingly similar to, and even includes, central aspects of economic rationality. His theory then veers off, however, when it gets to one of the major components of modern economically rational choice theory, which are the preferences that guide individuals’ decisions. Unbeholden to disciplinary boundaries of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, he mentions economic rationality only to delve into the variety of personality types and mental programming of the people he observed around him. Desires, emotions, and cultural values influence rational choice of different stereotypes in the Virtues and Vices. Likewise, his student Theophrastus also found the diversity of ancient Greek preferences to be more interesting than the decision-making process itself, particularly how the rational and irrational parts of the brain interact. Aristotle and Theophrastus describe economic rationality but their account of rational choice focuses more on the different personality types, and how emotions and irrational desires intensify, warp, or bypass altogether the rational calculating processes of the brain for some individuals.
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